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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA
AND THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT

The slowly developing recognition that special procedural
safeguards are necessary in order to protect the due process
rights of the mentally ill' received new support from the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal's recent opinion in Shrader v. Harris.2
At least with respect to Social Security disability claims,
Shrader carves out a narrow exception to the doctrine of administrative res judicata' The court's decision prohibits:

' See Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV.

157 (1979).

2 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1980).
3 20 C.F.R. § 404.937(a) (1979) provides that with respect to Social Security
claims an administrative law judge may, on his own motion, dismiss a hearing request where a previous decision by the Secretary with respect to the rights of the
same party on the same facts regarding the same issue has become final.
Claude Danny Shrader filed applications for disability benefits in 1968, 1970,
1974, and 1977 alleging on each occasion "physical disability caused by shrapnel
wounds he received in Vietnam." 631 F.2d at 299. Shrader presented each of the
first three claims pro se and each was decided adversely to Shrader without a
hearing. Shrader did not appeal any of these decisions.
Shrader was assisted by an attorney on his 1977 claim. This claim was denied
ex parte. Shrader asked for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
In support of this motion, Shrader filed a report conducted by a psychiatrist and
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[The Secretary from summarily invoking the doctrine of res
judicata when a claimant presents prima facie proof that mental
illness prevented him from understanding the procedure
necessary to obtain an evidentiary hearing after the denial of
his prior pro se claim. Instead, the Secretary will be obliged to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the claimant's
mental competency. Only if the claimant is found incompetent
need the Secretary afford him an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of his claim.'
Before the court could reach the merits of Shrader's claim,
they had to address the question of whether the federal courts
had jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision not to hold a
hearing on a claim. The district court dismissed the action for
want of jurisdiction, relying on Califano v. Sanders5 and Teague

v. Califano.' The Fourth Circuit believed that the district court
had failed to appreciate the constitutional question exception to
the general rule against judicial review."

clinical psychologist in 1977 which dealt with Shrader's mental competency. The
ALJ dismissed this request concluding that "the psychiatric report did not
establish mental impairment prior to 1971 when Shrader met the Act's earning
requirements." Id. The ALJ applied the doctrine of res judicata found in 20
C.F.R. § 404.937(a) and "held that the ex parte denial of the 1974 application
barred the right to a hearing on the 1977 claim." Id.
631 F.2d at 302.
430 U.S. 99 (1977). In Sanders the Court rejected the argument that 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(h) and 405(g) confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review the
Secretary's decision not to reopen a claim.
Section 405(h) of the Social Security Act provides that "[n]o findings of fact
or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency" except where such review is provided for within the Act. Section
405(g) is the only section in the Act which deals with judicial review. It allows
review of "any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing ...." (emphasis added).
' 560 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1977). In this case the court extended the applicability of Sanders' jurisdictional bar beyond motions to reopen to administrative res
judicata decisions. Id. at 617-18. As for the further extension of the bar to ex
parte denials, See Matos v. Secretary, 581 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1978).
As explained in Sanders:
Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions ...[W]hen constitutional questions
are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will
not read a statutory scheme to take the "extraordinary" step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress' intent to do so is manifested by
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In light of the recognition that entitlement of Social Security disability benefits is a statutory property interest protected
by the due process clause,8 the Fourth Circuit correctly identified the existing constitutional claim. It stated that although
Shrader "did not expressly cite the fifth amendment, it is apparent that he claimed a denial of due process on the ground
that his mental illness prevented him from understanding the
procedures to obtain review of the denial of his earlier claims.",
The fact that Shrader's constitutional claim was not squarely presented to the Secretary did not effect the court's jurisdiction.'0 The court noted that Shrader's constitutional claim was
only collateral to his claim for benefits, that his administrative
remedies had been exhausted by the presentation of his claim in
1977, and that the dismissal of his request for a hearing and the
resulting denial of benefits constituted a final agency action.'
Given these facts and the fact that the constitutional question
"was inappropriate for decision by the Secretary" the court concluded that it had "jurisdiction over [Shrader's] constitutional
claim."' 2
In addressing the merits of Shrader's constitutional claim,
the court employed the test established by the Supreme Court
in Mathews v. Eldridge'3 for determining whether challenged
administration procedures comport with procedural due process.
Application of this analysis clearly supports the Fourth Circuit's
imposition of minimal additional procedural steps aimed at ensuring due process protection for the mentally incompetent who
"clear and convincing" evidence.

430 U.S. at 109.

8 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971).
"

631 F.2d at 299.
Id. at 300.
Id.

12

Id.

11424 U.S. 319 (1976). The three distinct factors to be considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Id. at 335.
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might otherwise never enjoy the fundamental right of" 'the opportunity to be heard' ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'"
Eldridge's first requirement,15 that a private interest be affected by the official action was readily satisfied in this case. If
the ex parte denial of a previous application is allowed to support summary res judicata dismissal of subsequent applications,
a disabled claimant who is mentally ill, despite his incompetency,
will forever be denied a chance to be heard."6
The second element of the Eldridge test required a consideration of the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest through the [administrative] procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.""' Congress demonstrated an awareness of the risk
of an erroneous deprivation in this type of proceeding by affording de novo evidentiary hearings as a matter of right to claimants receiving ex parte denials, 8 however, it failed to address
the predicament of the mentally ill claimant incapable of
understanding the provided procedure." The court refused to attribute Congress' silence to an intent to deprive the mentally ill
claimant of a hearing by the application of the doctrine of res
judicata.'
The court in addressing the value of additional procedural
safeguards concluded that "the Secretary [could] eliminate this
risk [to the mentally incompetent claimant] by conducting a hearing on the claimant's competency before invoking the doctrine
[of res judicata] to bar his subsequent claim.""

, 631 F.2d at 301 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
IS

See note 13 supra.

"

631 F.2d at 301.

"
15

See note 13 supra.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976).

iS

631 F.2d at 301-302.

The court noted that if it interpreted the statute as precluding a hearing
for the mentally incompetent it "would raise an unnecssary, and therefore improper, question of its constitutionality." Id. at 302. (citing Greene v. McElroy,
306 U.S. 474, 507-508 (1950) and Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 348 (1936)).
" 631 F.2d at 302.
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The final element of the Eldridge test required the court to
"consider the burden on the government of changing the challenged procedure."' The Fourth Circuit believed that the
burden placed on the Secretary by the additional procedures it
must employ when dealing with mentally incompetent claimants
was "relatively light.""
The court noted that its "opinion applies solely to claimants
afflicted by mental illness whose initial claims, presented pro se,
were denied ex parte. ' The burden is on the claimant to "present prima facie evidence of incompetency."2" If he meets this
burden the Secretary is required to grant a claimant an evidentiary hearing to determine the claimant's mental competency.'
The Secretary must afford the claimant an evidentiary hearing
on the merits of his claim only if the claimant can establish his
incompetency.'
The court concluded its opinion by noting that while the
judiciary was the proper forum to decide constitutional questions it was the Secretary who must initiate the fact-finding process necessary to implement the court's constitutional decision.'
The court, therefore, ordered the district court to remand the
case to the Secretary so that an evidentiary hearing might be
held to determine Shrader's mental competency to understand
the administrative process and its implications.'
Win. Douglas Taylor

See note 13 supra.
631 F.2d at 302.
2Id.

SId.
26Id.
'Id.
2Id.

Id. at 302-303.
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II. THE Chrysler v. Brown STANDARD: PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH SERVICES' COST REPORTS

In Humana of Virginia v..Blue Cross of Virginia,1 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the conflicting in-

terests of the public's right to know, granted by the disclosure
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter
FOIA),2 and the desire for confidentiality generally held by
those obligated to comply with governmental demands for information.' Humana of Virginia (hereinafter Humana), providers of
services under the Medicare program,' are required to file cost
reports containing detailed financial information with Blue

Cross of Virginia. 5 By force of a regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, these cost reports
are available to the public upon written request.' After receiving notification that Blue Cross intended to comply with such a
request, Humana, alleging that the regulation mandating disclosure contravened both exemption four of the FOIA7 and the
Trade Secrets Act," sought injunctive relief to prevent disclo622 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1980).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 285 (1979).
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq (1976).
5 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395g(a) (1980 Supp.); 42 C.F.R. § 405.453 (1979).
6 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 (1980). This regulation provides: "The following shall be
made available to the public under the conditions specified: ... (c)Upon request in
writing, cost reports submitted by providers of services pursuant to section 1816
of the Act to enable the Secretary to determine amounts due such providers."
7 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). This section exempts matters that are privileged, confidential, commercial, financial in nature, or trade secrets from the
general requirements of the Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). This section provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of
any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or
makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any
information coming to him in the course of his employment or official
duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or
return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates
to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus,
or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership,
corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy
thereof of any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be
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sure. The district court relied upon the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger in reaching its
conclusion that the cost reports supplied by Humana contained
information protected from disclosure by exemption four of the
FOIA. The district court, therefore, believed it was proper to
enjoin disclosure of these materials to prevent the likelihood of
substantial harm to Humana's competitive position.
The Fourth Circuit stayed Humana's appeal of the district
court's holding pending the Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown."° The court applied the test established in
Chrysler" and held that the Secretary's regulation1 2 enjoys the
"force and effect of law;" and, therefore, disclosure of the cost
reports pursuant to the regulation is not prohibited by section
1905 of the Trade Secrets Act." The court further held that pro-

seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined
not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and shall be removed from office or employment.
9 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom Brown v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
Westinghouse held, inter alia, that the FOIA "confers on a supplier of
private information, an implied right to invoke the equity jurisdiction to enjoin
the disclosure of information within Exemption 4." Id. at 1210. The district court
in Humana believed that, under this holding, Humana was entitled to injunctive
relief if it could demonstrate that its cost reports were " 'confidential' within the
meaning of exemption 4." Humana of Virginia, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Virginia, 455
F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (E.D. Va. 1978).
II 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
II The Supreme Court's holding in Chrysler differed from the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Westinghouse by rejecting the notions that the FOIA and
Trade Secrets Act (42 U.S.C. § 1905) created private causes of action to enjoin the
disclosure of information that may fall within exemption 4 of the FOIA or violate
the Trade Secrets Act respectively. 441 U.S. at 294, 316.
The Court in Chrysler held that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A)) provided for judicial review of an agency's decision to
release material which could conceivably contravene § 1905. Id. at 317. The Court
noted that a disclosure of information in violation of § 1905 is "not in accordance
with law" and that § 706(2)(A) of the APA requires reviewing courts to set aside
agency action which is not in accord with the applicable law. Id. at 318. However,
the Court further noted that if disclosure of information is "authorized by law" it
is not in violation of § 1905. Id. at 295-300. Thus, the question facing the Fourth
Circuit in Humana was "whether 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 provides the authorization
by law contemplated by § 1905 which permits disclosure." 622 F.2d at 78.
20 C.F.R. § 422.435 (1980).
" 622 F.2d at 79. See note 11 supra.
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mulgation of the regulation, judged in accordance with the standard of review provided under the Administrative Procedure
Act, was not arbitrary and capricious and therefore should not
be set aside."
As a result of the Chrysler decision, the court was limited to
determining "whether 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 provides the authorization by law contemplated by § 1905 which permits disclosure."'5 The Supreme Court established a three-part test in
Chrysler for determining whether a regulation has the "force
and effect of law" necessary to provide the required authorization." Humana conceded that the first two parts of the test were
satisfied with respect to 20 C.F.R. § 422.435,7 so it was only
necessary for the court to determine whether the required
nexus existed between the regulation and the delegation of
legislative authority.
A specific grant of authority to promulgate the regulation is
not needed to establish this nexus. 8 A court must only be able
to reasonably conclude "that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations issued."'9 Considering the language Congress incorporated into the relevant grant of legislative authority, 1 the Fourth Circuit concluded that disclosure regulations
like 20 C.F.R. § 422.435 had been contemplated. 21 Congress provided that "[n]o disclosure ... of any file, record, report or any
other paper, or any information, obtained at any time by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare .. .shall be made
except as the Secretary... may by regulationprescribe .... 22
Such comprehensive language would clearly prohibit disclosure
of the cost reports submitted by Humana were it not for the
" Id. at 79-80.
"

"

Id. at 78. See note 11 supra.
441 U.S. at 301-04. The three parts of the test require that: 1) the regula-

tion must be a substantive or legislative-type rule; 2) the regulation must have
been promulgated in accordance with the rule-making requirements of the APA;
and 3) a nexus must be shown between the regulation and some delegation of the
requisite legislative authority by Congress.
17 622 F.2d at 78.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979).
"Id.

Section 1106(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1976).
2 622 F.2d at 79.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1976).
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Secretary's issuance of regulations permitting disclosure. The
Secretary has broad discretion in permitting disclosure of such
information; therefore, "[a]t the very least § 1306 may
reasonably be construed to contemplate the promulgation of 20
C.F.R. § 422.435."' With the nexus requirement met, the regulation "is entitled to 'force and effect of law'." Accordingly,
disclosure of the cost reports pursuant to the regulation is not
prohibited by § 1905.'24
In analyzing Humana's final contention, that promulgation of
the regulation was arbitrary and capricious, the Fourth Circuit
noted that it was limited to ascertaining whether regulation was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors.' The
Secretary's statement which accompanied the promulgation of
20 C.F.R. § 422 revealed that it was his opinion that release of
the reports would make providers more accountable to the
public and thereby promote proper expenditure of public
funds.28 The Secretary had also considered and rejected nondisclosure alternatives as being inconsistent with the FOIA.Y To
give the provider the option of preparing an abstract of the complete cost report was also unacceptable because it would allow
the provider to withhold from the public any information he
chose.' The Secretary finally concluded that even though the
cost reports may contain confidential financial information, "it is
not in the public interest to withhold the reports from the
public."' The court believed that the Secretary had obviously
based its regulation on the consideration of relevant factors;
and, therefore, it was not arbitrary and capricious."

1 622 F.2d at 79 (quoting St. Mary's Hosp. Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 410

(5th Cir. 1979)).

Id.
Id. The court noted that they were not permitted to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary under the Supreme Court's holding in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). They noted further that
24
2

the Court's holding in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) required that
their determination "be made on the administrative record and not by de novo
review." 622 F.2d at 79.
1 40 Fed. Reg. 27,648-49 (1975).
27

Id.

23 Id.

2 Id.
" 622 F.2d at 80.
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Given the limited scope of review' and the holding of Chrys-

ler v. Brown,' the Fourth Circuit was clearly justified in reversing the district court and concluding that disclosure of the cost
reports was in accordance with the law."

Win. Douglas Taylor

CINIL PROCEDURE
I.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETS WEST VIRGINIA'S
"SAVINGS STATUTE"

West Virginia's "savings statute"' was accorded a liberal
construction by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case of Stare v. Pearcy.2 The savings statute provides that
if an action is dismissed or reversed upon a ground which would
not preclude a new action for the same cause, the statute of
limitations which would normally apply to the action will be ex-

tended one year from the date of the dismissal or reversal.3 In
Stare, dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defen-

dants from a foreign forum was held to constitute an involuntary dismissal of the type necessary to invoke the protection of
the savings statute in extending the applicable statute of limitations.'
The plaintiffs in Stare, husband and wife and citizens of
Ohio, were injured in an automobile collision in West Virginia.
, See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
= 441 U.S. 281 (1979). See note 11 supra.
622 F.2d at 80.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-18 (1981 Replacement Vol.).
617 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1980).
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-18 (1981 Replacement Vol.) provides:
If any action or suit commenced within due time ... should be arrested or reversed on a ground which does not preclude a new action or
suit for the same cause, or if there be occasion to bring a new action of
suit by reason of such cause having been dismissed for want of security
for costs, or by reason of any other cause which could not be pled in bar
of an action or suit ... the same may be brought within one year after
such ... dismissal ... or after such arrest or reversal ....
' 617 F.2d at 46.
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They filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio within the time period statutorily prescribed for tort actions by both Ohio and West Virginia
law,' but their complaint was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, a West Virginia citizen. Subsequently they brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia, where their action was
dismissed on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations
had run prior to their filing. This decision reflected a narrow interpretation of the provisions of West Virginia Code section
55-2-18. It asserted that dismissal from a federal district court of
another state did not provide a basis for extending the statutory
limitations period to allow plaintiffs to maintain their suit after
the expiration of the original two-year period.' Plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the remedial nature of the statute mandated a liberal
construction- one which would allow involuntary dismissal from
another jurisdiction to invoke the one-year extension granted by
the savings statute.7
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the purpose of the
statute was to remedy the harsh effect of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff appears to have a cognizable claim but
through mistake or inadvertence has suffered dismissal or reversal in a trial court.' It determined that this remedy should be
available to those persons whose mistake involved the improper
filing of a suit in a foreign forum.9
Although the precise question presented in Stare had never
been addressed by a West Virginia court, the Fourth Circuit
cited two West Virginia cases in support of its holdings. 10 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Tompkins v. Pacific

I Both Ohio and West Virginia have a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12
(1981 Replacement Vol.).
0 401 F. Supp. 994, 996 (N.D.W. Va. 1975).
' 617 F.2d at 45.
0Id.

9Id.
0 Litten v. Peer, 156 W. Va. 791, 197 S.E.2d 322 (1973); Tompkins v. Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 W. Va. 479, 44 S.E. 439 (1903).
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Mutual Life Insurance Co." held that the savings statute would
operate to give the plaintiffs an extension of one year from the
date that their original action had been dismissed from a federal
court in West Virginia in which to file an action in a West
Virginia state court. In 1973 the West Virginia court reaffirmed
the holding in Tompkins in Litten v. Peer." The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the "guidance" to be gleaned from these cases
was that "West Virginia's saving statute is to be liberally construed."'"
Judge Field, who filed a dissent in Stare, vigorously opposed
the majority's holding. He cited a number of cases from jurisdictions other than West Virginia which had held that the filing
and subsequent dismissal of a case in a foreign jurisdiction did
not save a later action filed in the courts of the forum state after
the statute of limitations had run but within a year of the dismissal in the foreign jurisdiction." Judge Field also criticized
the majority for citing the holdings of Tompkins and Litten in
support of their decision."
The difference of opinion exhibited in this case between
Judge Field and the majority does not involve any faulty interpretations of the statute or case precedents. Rather, it represents an honest split of opinion over whether a dismissal of a
claim from a foreign jurisdiction will allow the unsuccessful
claimant to receive the benefits of the forum state's savings
statute in extending the time in which he may file an action in

* 52 W. Va. 479, 44 S.E. 439 (1903).
12156 W. Va. 791, 197 S.E.2d 322 (1973).

617 F.2d at 46.
Andrew v. Bendix Corp., 452 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1971), cert den., 406 U.S.
920 (1972); Riley v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 182 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1949); Estate of
Tuckman v. Estate of Cottle, 175 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1949); High v. Boradnax, 271
"

N.C. 313, 156 S.E.2d 822 (1967); Morris v. Wise, 293 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1956).

" Judge Field noted both Tompkins and Litten had involved situations
where the first action had been commenced in a federal court in West Virginia
and the second action was allowed to proceed when it was filed in a state court
"within the period allowed by the savings statute." 617 F.2d at 48. Judge Field
concluded that the West Virginia Supreme Court's sanction of the use of the savings statute in this manner was the result of an application of the "general rule"
and was not evidence of a willingness to interpret the savings statute liberally.
Id.
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the forum state." This split was brought on by a lack of controlling precedent in West Virginia; however, given the West
Virginia court's apparent practice of liberally interpreting the
savings statute in other contexts,17 the majority's opinion seems
most in harmony with this approach.
Laurie J. Garrigan

CIVIL RIGHTS
I.

STANDING FOR TESTERS UNDER THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT

The Fair Housing Act of 19681 provides a method for the
elimination of discrimination in the sale and leasing of housing
based upon race, color, religion, national origin and sex.2 In
order to further the purposes of the Act, Congress expanded the
traditional standing requirements to include a broad class of
potential plaintffs.3 Questions soon arose as to how large Congress meant to expand the plaintiff class. Coles v. Havens Realty
Corp.,4 the most recent case attempting to delineate the boundaries of the class of aggrieved persons who may bring a suit

, Cases from other jurisdictions can be found to support both sides of the
dispute. Compare the cases cited in note 14 supra which support Judge Field's
position with Abele v. A.L. Dougherty Overseas, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ind.
1961), McCrary v. U.S. Fidelty & Guar. Co., 110 F. Supp. 545 (W.D. S.C. 1953), and
Leavy v. Saunders, 319 A.2d 44 (Del. Super. 1974).
1 See, e.g., Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Biser, 242 S.E.2d 208 (W. Va. 1978);
Keener v. Reynolds Transp. Co., 134 W. Va. 712, 61 S.E.2d 629 (1950); McClung v.
Tieche, 126 W. Va. 575, 29 S.E.2d 250 (1944); Ryan v. Peney Coal & Coke Co., 69
W. Va. 692, 73 S.E. 330 (1912).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (1976).
Congress intended to provide all victims of Title VI [Fair Housing Act]
violations two alternative mechanisms by which to seek redress: immediate suit
in federal district court (42 U.S.C. § 3612), or a simple, inexpensive, informal conciliation procedure, to be followed by litigation should conciliation efforts fail (42
U.S.C. § 3610). Galdstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104 (1979).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a), 3612(a) (1976). The rules of standing may be modified
by statute in those instances in which the case or controversy requirement of Artice III is still met. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
1 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980).
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under the Act, addresses a question that has not been answered
by the United States Supreme Court: does a tester5 of housing
discrimination have standing to sue under the Fair Housing
Act?8
The Coles suit was brought under sections 3601, 3604, and
8612(a) of the Fair Housing Act,' and section 1982 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.8 Three individual plaintiffs, a renter and two
testers, all of whom resided in the City of Richmond or Henrico
County, Virginia, and one corporate plaintiff, attempted to
secure rental information from the defendants, a realty company
and its employee." The renter and a tester, both black were advised by the defendants that no vacancies existed at specific
apartment complexes in Henrico County. The white tester, who
requested rental information on the same days as the black
tester was advised by the defendants that vacancies did, in fact,
exist at the same apartment complexes about which the black
tester had inquired. The plaintiffs filed suit both individually
and as a class consisting of all persons who had rented or sought
t. rent residential property in Henrico County and who were
adversely affected by the defendant realty company's discriminatory practices." The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as a class, and, in addition, compensatory and punitive
damages as individuals."

5 "Testing" is a procedure by which individuals posing as prospective purchasers or tenants survey sales practices of real estate agents to determine if the
agency is using discriminatory methods.
I Some lower federal courts have begun to answer the question of tester
standing under the Fair Housing Act without guidance from the United States
Supreme Court: Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co.,
429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (a coalition of residents who had organized a
"testing program" was granted standing under the Fair Housing Act); Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1975), affd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir.
1976) (except in the case of a refusal to deal, the Fair Housing Act does not require that a prospective buyer be a bona fide purchaser); Cf. Myers v. Pennypack
Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977) (tester has standing
to assert housing discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §
1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3604, 3612(a) (1976).
a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976).
633 F.2d at 385.
10Id. at 386.
1 Id.
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The district court dismissed all claims except that of the

renter, holding that the tester and corporate plaintiffs lacked
standing to assert discrimination proscribed by the Fair Housing Act.12 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
to the district court, holding that all plaintiffs, including the
tester plaintiffs, had standing to assert discrimination under the
Fair Housing Act. The court did not reach the question of
whether the plaintiffs should be granted standing to prove
defendants' violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1982.13
The court found that strong public policy reasons existed for
affording standing to testers of racial discrimination who
unearth Fair Housing Act violations.14 In those instances where
no other effective challenge can be mounted against actions
frustrating vital public policy, the court found that testers play
an important role in overcoming the evil that exists. 5 The notion
of the private attorney general who assists in vindicating the
congressional purpose of the Fair Housing Act has previously
been used to grant standing to apartment dwellers who had not
personally experienced housing discrimination."6 The court in
Coles concluded that testers served the same role as private attorneys general in carrying
out the Congressional intent
7
manifested in the Act.1

The court's finding of standing in Coles was not the first
time standing had been granted to testers of racial discrimination. The United States Supreme Court in Evers v. Dwyer18 and
1'Id. at 385.
Id. at 387-88.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were guilty of "racial steering,"
a practice by which real estate firms direct potential purchasers of-tenants to certain areas based solely on their race or ethnic group. Because the real estate firm
never mentions race or ethnicity to the inquirer, he may never realize that he has
been discriminated against. Id. at 385.
" Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). See also
Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 396 (1970); Allen v. State Board of Elections,
393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), for examples of the
role of private attorneys general in modern legislation.
"

1,633 F.2d at 388.

1,358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam). Evers held that a black resident who attempted to sit in front of a segregated bus had standing as a tester to sue officials
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Pierson v. Ray 9 found that testers of racial discrimination in
public facilities had standing to assert an injury. The Coles'
court found that the housing discrimination testers served the
same fundamental purpose as the public facilities' testers even
though the testers in Coles merely inquired about apartment
rentals and did not apply to rent an apartment. The housing
testers' inquiry, the Fourth Circuit found, constituted the first
step in eradicating racial discrimination in housing, the right to
which is no less important than the rights affecting human dignity in Evers and Pierson.0
A plaintiff must allege a demonstrable, particularized injury
to himself in order to meet standing requirements and thus obtain judicial review. 2' The testers in Coles alleged that they
were residents of Henrico County, and that the defendants'
practice of racial steering adversely affected the area in which
they live. The black tester claimed the defendants had denied
her the right to rent property and to make and enforce contracts for the lease of real estate in Henrico County, that she
had been deprived of the advantages and conveniences she
would have enjoyed from living in the area, and that she had
"been deprived of the right to the important social, professional,
business, political, and aesthetic benefits of interracial associations that arise from living in integrated communities free from
housing discrimination."' The white tester claimed deprivation
of the same rights that an integrated community would have afforded the black tester.'
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.2' and
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood'5 tenants and village
residents, respectively, made similar allegations of loss of social
and professional benefits due to defendants' discriminatory
of the City of Memphis, the Memphis Street Railway Company, and one of the
Company's employees.
1, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Pierson held that a group of black and white
clergymen attempting to use a waiting room in a segregated bus terminal had
standing as testers to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
0 633 F.2d at 387.
1 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
" 633 F.2d at 386-87.
23 Id.

'

409 U.S. 205 (1972).

23441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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housing practices. The United States Supreme Court awarded
both the tenants and residents standing under the Fair Housing
Act notwithstanding the fact that they had not been personally
turned away from housing for discriminatory reasons. 8 The
Supreme Court found in both cases that the plaintiffs had alleged
an injury in fact. Analogizing to those cases, the Fourth Circuit
found that the testers in Coles had experienced no less of an injury than the apartment tenants or housing residents in the two
foregoing cases and that the tester plaintiffs had alleged "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" so as to
satisfy Article III case or controversy requirementsY
Reliance on testers in housing discrimination cases has in
the past been limited to using testers' documentation to assist in
proving an injury to the community and its residents.' But,
testers play a vital role in furthering the purposes of the Fair
Housing Act, and as individuals in their own right and as
members of the community which is injured by racial steering
and other discriminatory practice, they should uniformly be
granted standing by the federal courts. Coles is the first federal
circuit court case that has clearly taken such a position. In light
of the liberal standing policies of the Fair Housing Act, it will
most certainly not be the last.
Jill Kramer Traina

II.

LOCAL LEGISLATORS GRANTED ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY FROM SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruce v. Riddle' has
extended absolute immunity from damage liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to members of county councils acting within the

' In neither case did the United States Supreme Court hold that the plaintiffs had standing as testers. In Trafficante the plaintiffs did not allege that they
were testers, while in Bellwood the plaintiffs did not press their claim that they
had standing to sue as testers when their case was heard by the Supreme Court.

633 F.2d at 390.
See, e.g., Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (1975).
1 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980).
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scope of their legislative duties. The holding expands the protection of absolute immunity from section 1983 actions which the
United States Supreme Court has previously granted to state
legislators' and regional legislators.3
In Bruce, the plaintiff landowner brought an action against
Greenville, South Carolina and members of the Greenville County Council, in their official and individual capacities, after the
county council rezoned an area of land to prohibit multi-family
dwellings.4 The landowner had planned to build a federally subsidized 150-unit apartment complex on the land and subsequently brought this action under section 1983 claiming that the
zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally enacted.' The county
council had rezoned the land after meeting privately with influential citizens who feared that public housing would be
developed on the property.6
The district court granted the motion of the individual county
council members for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It held that
the, landowner's complaint failed to state a cause of action as to
the individual members because they were entitled to absolute
legislative immunity.7
The landowner appealed the district court's dismissal of the
individual county council members to the Fourth Circuit. He
asked the court to determine whether county councilmen had
absolute immunity from damage suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; and, in the event that they were immune, whether the private meetings they had prior to passing the zoning ordinance
placed them outside the scope of their immunity.8
In addressing the first issue presented for resolution, the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the reasoning of various United States
Supreme Court decisions which have held that absolute immunity
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391 (1979).
631 F.2d at 273.
SId.
2

6

Id. at 274.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
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protects certain state government officers from suit arising
under section 1983. In Tenney v. Brandhove9 the United States
Supreme Court grounded its decision that state legislators had
absolute immunity from a suit brought under section 1983 on ancient English and early American common law. Common law had
reflected the need to encourage legislators to discharge their
public trust with firmness by protecting them from damage
suits." This common law protection had become so well established by the time Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
which contained the predecessor of section 1983, that the Court
reasoned that Congress had not intended to "impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion
in the general language of § 1983.""l
The Fourth Circuit noted that neither English nor American
common law had traditionally granted immunity from suit to
local legislators. 2 However, it believed that the lack of this
tradition was attributable to the fact that there were "relatively
few early local legislative bodies" and thus few suits against
local legislators." The court concluded that Tenney had been
written in a generic sense and its rationale for "immunizing
state legislatures could logically apply with equal force to local
legislators.""1
The Fourth Circuit then reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in Butz v. Economou"l and Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency" in which the Court took a
functional approach to the issue of immunity. Butz had held that
judicial immunity extended to administrative law judges
because the special nature of administrative law judges' responsibilities were of the same nature as judges protected by absolute immunity. 17 In Lake Country Estates, the nature of
regional legislators' responsibilities was found to be functionally
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 376.
" 631 F.2d at 276.
"Id. at 277.
"

"Id.

15 438 U.S. 478 (1978)

440 U.S. 391 (1979).
438 U.S. at 511.
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equivalent to that of state legislators, thus the Supreme Court
found that the former also enjoyed absolute immunity from federal damage suits. 8 Lake Country Estates would seem to logically extend to cover local legislators but for the fact that the
Supreme Court specifically refused to decide that issue." The
Fourth Circuit noted, however, that four members of the Court
in Owens v. City of Independence"° has used language which
seemed to indicate that they believed section 1983 immunity had
already been extended to local legislators at the city council
level.2
Armed with the opinion of these four members of the Court
and utilizing the Supreme Court's functional approach to determine whether immunity exists, the Fourth Circuit held that
local legislatures at the county council level were absolutely immune from suits brought under section 1983.1
Turning its attention to the scope of this immunity, the
Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a county council's
private meetings with interest groups prior to an official vote
lay outside the protection of absolute immunity for legislative
acts. The court reasoned that modern legislative procedures
through which legislators receive information bearing on proposed legislation include private meetings with interest
groups.u In addition, the Fourth Circuit found that both Tenney
and Lake Country Estates had asserted that immunity extends
to legislative acts beyond the mere delivering of a speech or the
giving of a vote.' Therefore, the court of appeals found that the
county council was acting within the scope of its legislative
duties when it met with partisans on one side of the zoning controversy and that such a legislative act was absolutely immune
from suit under section 1983.1
Jill Kramer Traina
"

440 U.S. at 405, n.30, 406, 408.

19Id. at 404, n.26.

445 U.S. 622 (1980).

21 See 445 U.S. at 664, n.6 (Powell. J. dissenting). The four members of the

Court referred to are the Chief Justice and Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist.
631 F.2d at 279.

Id. at 280.

24

Id.

2 Id.
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COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS UNDER THE AGE

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
In response to continuing discriminatory practices affecting
the employment of older persons, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1 in 1967 "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment. '2 The Act incorporates the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act3 and the statutes of limitations contained in the Portal-ToPortal Pay Act.4
One of the Act's enforcement provisions' allows the
Secretary of Labor' to seek injunctive relief to restrain violations of the Act. Another enforcement provision7 allows the
Secretary to sue on behalf of individuals to recover back pay
due to the aggrieved individuals, and for liquidated damages.
This provision defined the commencement of an action for purposes of tolling the applicable statute of limitations for each individual claimant as being "the date when the complaint is filed
if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or
if his name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which
his name is added as a party plaintiff in such action."'
Against this statutory background, the Fourth Circuit in

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1976).
2 Id. at § 621.
6 Id. at § 626(b). This provision provides that "[t]he provisions of this chapter
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures, provided in sections 211(b), 217 of this title:' 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-17 (1976) contain the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Id. at § 626(e). This provision provides that "[slections 255 and 259 of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976) is the statute
of limitations provision of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act.
Id. at § 217 [This section will hereinafter be referred to as Section 17].
All functions vested in Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and its incorporated provisions were transferred to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by section 1 and 2 of 1978 Reorg.
Plan No. 1, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978).
29 U.S.C.A. § 216(c) (West Supp. 1980) [This section will hereinafter be
refered to as Section 16(c)].

6 Id.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Gilbarco, Inc.,
was required to define when an action brought by the Secretary
under section 17 of the Act has been commenced for statute of
limitations purposes. The court was confronted with a situation
in which the Secretary had filed an action under section 17 of
the Act prior to the running of the applicable three-year statute
of limitations but had failed to name any individual claimaints. 1
Subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations, the individual claimants' names were obtained by the defendant
through use of discovery. The narrow issue confronting the
court was whether the "commencement of action" definition of
section 16(c) was applicable to section 17 actions brought by the
Secretary.
The court first determined that the remedies provided in
sections 16 and 17 were "distinct and alternative," and thus the
particular requirements of section 16(c) had no application to an
action brought under section 17.11 The court reasoned that "commencement of the action" was a term of art with a common es'tablished meaning-"the filing of a complaint."12 Thus, "commencement of an action," unless otherwise defined (as in section
16), should be given its established common meaning. Therefore,
the court held that the filing of the section 17 complaint by the
Secretary tolled the statute of limitations for all individuals who
were eventually named through discovery."
However, since the original complaint contained a claim for
liquidated damages recoverable only under section 16, the
9 615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980).
," A three-year statute of limitations applies when, as in this case, the
discharges are claimed to be willful violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
II

615 F.2d at 989.

12Id. at 990.

iS Id. The only cases cited by the court in support of its decision were two
district court decisions, Wirtz v. Novinger's, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Pa.
1966), and Wirtz v. W.G. Lockhard Constr. Co., 230 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
Both of these cases were decided prior to enactment of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; however, they held that a section 17 comlaint when used to enforce the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(1976)) "did not have to name the individuals on whose behalf the Secretary was
proceeding in order to effectively commence the action for statute of limitations
purposes." 615 F.2d at 990.
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Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
denying this element of the claim, but remanded for further consideration the rest of the claim seeking "employment, reinstatement and back pay," which it thought had been properly
brought under section 17.11
This remand prompted a rather lengthy and well-reasoned
dissenting opinion by Judge Murnaghan who questioned the remand on the issue of back pay. Judge Murnaghan contends that
back pay claims are subject to the section 16(c) limitations since
it is that section which provides for recovery of back pay. 5
However, section 626(b) of the Act provides:
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall
have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may
be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling employment,
reinstatment or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.16
Due to the obviously broad coverage of this provision, the
results reached in Gilbarco can be seen as effectuating the purpose of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
John Kent Dorsey

COMMERCIAL LAW
I. DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY MATERIALS UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976
In United States v. Colonial Chevrolet, disclosure of grand
jury materials was sought by the United States Attorney
General and the State Attorney General of Virginia under 15

I' 615 F.2d at 990-91.
'5

Id. at 991-1018.

'

29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).

1 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).
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U.S.C. § 15f(b).2 This section was enacted as part of Title III of

the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.'
The express purpose of this Act was to create "an effective
mechanism to permit consumers to recover damages for conduct
which is prohibited by the Sherman Act, by giving state at-

torneys general a cause of action [to sue as parens patriae on
behalf of the states' citizens] against antitrust violators."'
Under the Act the United States Attorney General, when he has
brought an action under federal antitrust laws, is required to

give written notification to any state attorney general who he
believes would be entitled to bring an action under the parens
patriae authority.5 Such an action must be based on substantially
the same violation of antitrust law as was the federal action.'

The Act also requires that the United States Attorney General
provide the state attorney general, to the extent permitted by
law, with any relevant or material investigative files or other
materials.'
15 U.S.C.A. § 15f (1981 Supp.) states:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General of the United States has
brought an action under the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe
that any State attorney general would be entitled to bring an action
under sections 12 to 27 of this title based substantially on the same
alleged violation of the antitrust laws, he shall promptly give written
notification thereof to such State attorney general.
(b) To assist a State attorney general in evaluating the notice or in
bringing any action under sections 12 to 27 of this title, the Attorney
General of the United States shall, upon request by such State attorney
general, make available to him, to the extent permitted by law, any investigative files or other materials which are or may be relevant or
material to the actual or potential cause of action under sections 12 to
27 of this title.
' The Act has been extensively discussed in Scher, Emerging Issues Under
the Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1978), and Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977-78). Neither article, however,
touches on the specific problem involved in this proceeding.
' Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 756 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In his report on the final bill as submitted by the conferees, the senate floor
leader for the bill stated that "[t]itle III is the legislative response to the present
inability of our judicial system to afford equal justice to consumers for violation of
the antitrust laws." 122 CONG. REc. 29148 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk).
'See note 2 supra.
See note 2 supra.
See note 2 supra.
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In this case the United States Attorney General notified the
Virginia attorney general of the successful federal antitrust
prosecution of Colonial Chevrolet Corporation. The Virginia attorney general requested that "all grand jury materials"
relating to the federal prosecution be made available to him.
Both the United States Attorney General and the attorney
general of Virginia then moved the federal district court with
jurisdiction over the matter for disclosure of the grand jury
materials. The district court denied the motion on two grounds;
first, the grand jury materials were not seen by the court as "investigative files" under the Act and therefore could not be
disclosed by the United States Attorney General, and second,
even if the grand jury materials were "investigative files," their
disclosure could only be allowed to the extent permitted by Rule
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' The court inter' 629 F.2d at 946. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
(2) General Rule of Secrecy-A grand juror, an interpreter, a
stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who
transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any
person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the
vote of any grand juror, may be made toWi)
an attorney for the government for use in the performance of
such attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an
attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under sub-paragraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury
material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the
government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly
provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand
jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the
persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be madeWi)
when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection
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preted this rule as requiring a showing of "particularized need"
which it believed was not met by the Virginia attorney general.,
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first considered the district
court's assertion that the term "investigative files," within the
meaning of the statute, did not include grand jury materials.
Judge Russell dismissed this argument, stating that the Act's
purpose was to make available all materials developed in the
federal investigation which were not restricted by law to the
State attorney general."0 The well-recognized use of grand jury
materials as investigative instruments was also cited as a factor
favoring disclosure." The opinion reasoned that any prevention
of disclosure of grand jury materials would negate the effectiveness of the Act. Further support for disclosure was found in
the fact that the only other federal circuit court to decide this
issue also concluded that grand jury materials were investigative files within the meaning of the statute.' 2
The court dismissed Colonial's argument that Senator
Abourezk's statements during the final senate debate on the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act demonstrated a
legislative intent that investigative files should not include
grand jury materials. These remarks were seen as merely inwith a judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss
the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand

jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and
under such conditions as the court may direct.
629 F.2d at 946.
10

Id. at 946-47.

Id. at 947. See ANTITRUST ADVISER, § 9.6, p. 602 (2d Ed. 1978); Unikel,
Discovery of Grand Jury Transcriptsin Civil Antitrust Cases in the Seventh Circuit-Fair Use or Abuse? 66 ILL. BAR. J. 706, n.1 (1978).
1 Id. at 947. See United States v. B.F. Goodrich, Co., 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.
1980).
"sId. at 947. Senator Abourezk in addressing § 15f(b) of the Act stated:
The section specifically limits the Attorney General's power to release
documents to whatever his powers are under existing law. Under existing law he cannot turn over materials given in response to a grand
jury demand or to a civil investigative demand. Therefore the section is
limited by existing law to cases where materials were turned over
"
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dicating that the United States Attorney General could not
voluntarily turn over grand jury materials to state attorneys
general. Nothing in Senator Abourezk's remarks was seen as
prohibiting the court from authorizing disclosure of the grand
jury materials in order to support proceedings in a state court."
The court relied heavily on the House Committee Report
concerning the statute. This report stated that the Act
"reflect[ed] the committee's desire that the Federal Government
cooperate fully with state antitrust enforcers" and that the
Justice Department's investigative files were to be made
available to the State attorney general "except where specifically
prohibited." 15
The opinion then considered whether Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "specifically prohibited"
disclosure of grand jury proceedings. The district court had held
that disclosure of grand jury materials was prohibited since the
voluntarily. This section is in the bill, because it was requested by
members of the House conferees, who had met on this.
122 CONG. REC. 29 (1976).
Id at 947-48.
' H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1975) reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2586.
The exact language of the House Committee Report is as follows:
Section 4F promotes parens patriae actions as a major aspect of
antitrust enforcement by encouraging Federal-State cooperation. The
section provides that whenever the United States has brought suit in
its proprietary capacity under § 4A of the Clayton Act, and the U.S. Attorney General believes that the same antitrust violation may have
given rise to potential parens patriae claims, he shall notify the appropriate State attorneys general. Whenever a State attorney general
so requests, in order to evaluate the notice from the U.S. Attorney
General or in order to bring a patriae action, section 4F(b) requires the
U.S. Attorney General to make the Justice Department's investigative
files available to the State attorneys general "to the extent permitted
by law." This means that the files are to be made available except
where specifically prohibited.
Section 4F(b) reflects the committee's desire that the Federal
Government cooperate fully with State antitrust enforcers.
The benefits of increases in Federal-State cooperation and coordination of antitrust enforcement are obvious, and are achieved in H.R.
8532 without the expenditure of additional Federal funds.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE.
CONG. & AD. NEWS. 2586-87.
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Virginia attorney general hd not shown a "particularized need"
for the disclosure.16 This requirement was found by the court to
7 Thus, in this
apply only in private litigation."
case, since a state
attorney general, with the capacity to maintain a parenspatriae
federal antitrust action, sought disclosure, a showing of particularized need was not required.18 The court supported this
view stating that Congress, in requiring disclosure of investigative materials, had resolved the public interest considerations surrounding such a disclosure. 19 Therefore, state attorneys general had been relieved of demonstrating a "particularized need" as a "threshold condition" for disclosure."0
The state attorney general's right to disclosure in parens
patriae suits was not seen as absolute, however, the burden of
showing why disclosure should not be granted was placed on
those opposing such a disclosure. 1 In such situations the district
judge can exercise discretion over whether disclosure should be
granted.1 This discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily.'
Moreover, the district court was given the power to impose
whatever protective limitations it deemed appropriate on the
use of disclosed materials.'
The only other federal circuit court to consider the issues
raised in Colonial was the Ninth Circuit in United States v. B.F.
" The district court noted that Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (See note 8 supra)did not establish an absolute bar to the disclosure of
grand jury proceedings. However, it believed that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), established the requirement that the parties seeking disclosure had to prove that "the need for
[disclosure] outweighs the public interest in secrecy." Id. at 223. In other words,
there had to be a demonstration of "particularized need" on the part of the applicant for disclosure. Id. at 221.
17 The Fourth Circuit noted that the requirements set forth in Douglas Oil
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), applied only where disclosure
was sought "by private parties engaged in private litigation." 629 F.2d at 949
(emphasis in original).
" 629 F.2d at 950.
19 1

20 Id.

"1Id. at 951.
' Id The Fourth Circuit did not give examples of situations in which it
would be within the discretion of the district judge to deny disclosure.
3 Id.
?A Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/14

28

et al.: Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit: 1980

1981]

FOURTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS

Goodrich, Co.21 In that case the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusions as the Fourth Circuit in Colonial. It held that Section 15f(b) "impliedly directs the Attorney General of the United
States to disclose grand jury materials to state attorneys
general without the showing of particularized and compelling
need which is normally required by Rule 6(e).1 2 The court con-

sidered the need for disclosure of grand jury materials to be
greater for state attorneys general than for individuals. This
greater need results from the important position which state attorneys general occupy in Congress's antitrust enforcement
scheme. 27
A federal district court ordered disclosure of grand jury
materials in In Re Montgomery County Real Estate.' The court
stated that the House Committee Report on Section 15f'
demonstrated "a Congressional intention to create an exception
to the general rule of grand jury secrecy."' Therefore, the
disclosure of grand jury materials to the state was seen as permissible when the materials would be helpful to the state in its
prosecution of a parens patriae antitrust action."
Several district courts have held that grand jury materials
are not investigative files and should not be disclosed, 2
however, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Colonial adds support
to the conclusion that the trend of opinion is toward the belief
that grand jury materials should be released to state attorneys
general upon the successful conclusion of a federal antitrust suit
against a business within their jurisdictions.
Louis F. Williams, Jr.

619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
tt

Id. at 801.

Id.
" 452 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978).
" See note 15 supra.

"452 F. Supp. at 62.
31Id.

" Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 62,809
(E. D. Ark. 1979); Matter of Grand Jury, 469 F. Supp. 666 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
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THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
EXPLAIN AN UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACT TERM
UNDER UCC SECTION 2-202

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brunswick Box Co.

v. Coutinho, Caro & Co.1 held that the parol evidence rule did
not bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence as to intentions of
parties in their use of the term "F.A.S. Norfolk, Virginia" in a
written agreement. Judge Merhige stated that although the
term itself was not ambiguous, other evidence provided a basis
for the conclusion that the parties had otherwise agreed as to
the meaning of the term.
This case involved a contract dispute between the Brunswick Box Co. and Coutinho, Caro & Co., a New York based exporter. The dispute centered around which party was obligated
to pay for the unloading of stevedore pallets from Brunswick's
trucks and the placing of the pallets into storage space contracted
out by Coutinho. The contract required Brunswick to ship the
pallets it had manufactured "F.A.S. Norfolk, Virginia." Brunswick delivered the pallets to the appropriate terminal but refused
to pay any unloading charges. Coutinho, under protest, paid all
of the unloading expenses. Shortly after Brunswick delivered all
of the pallets called for under the contract, Coutinho made a
claim for the unloading charges against a letter of credit which
Brunswick had been required to post under the terms of the contract. The bank paid Coutinho $52,237.50 out of Brunswick's letter of credit. This payment was based upon Coutinho's sworn
statement that Brunswick had broken the contract by not paying the unloading charges. Brunswick then filed a breach of contract suit against Coutinho alleging that the unloading of the
pallets was Coutinho's responsibility under the contract. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
however, directed a verdict against Brunswick. The district
court held that the contract represented the parties' final agreement and "that the meaning of the term 'F.A.S.', in light of the
custom in the port of Norfolk, clearly required Brunswick to pay
the pallet unloading charges."' The opinion stated that the
617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 361.
3 Id. at 357.
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evidence introduced by Brunswick was inadmissible under the
parol evidence rule since it contradicted the clear meaning of
the contract.'
On appeal Brunswick contended that although the term
"F.A.S. Norfolk" was clear and unambiguous, the disputed
evidence introduced at trial concerning the parties' course of
performance created a factual issue as to the meaning ascribed
to that term by the parties. Coutinho argued that the evidence
was properly excluded since it was inconsistent with the express terms of the contract.5
Judge Merhige began the circuit court's opinion by recognizing that the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) controlled any
interpretation of the contract.' The term "F.A.S." is defined in
Virginia Code § 8.2-319(2) in the following manner:
(2) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.A.S. vessel (which
means "free alongside") at a named port, even though used only
in connection with the stated price, is a delivery term under
which the seller must
(a) at his own expense and risk deliver the goods alongside the vessel in the manner usual in that port or on a
dock designated and provided by the buyer ...
Judge Merhige reasoned that the trial court erred when it
limited proof of how the parties might have otherwise agreed on
the term "usage of the port."7 The district court should have applied the test for admissibility of evidence under U.C.C. § 2-202
set out in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.'
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. involved a breach of contract action by Royster, a phosphate producer, against Columbia for Columbia's failure to purchase a certain amount of phosphate from
Royster. Columbia claimed that when the contract terms were

Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 357-58.
6 Virginia has adopted the U.C.C. and it controls all transactions involving
goods. VA. CODE § 8.2-102 (1965 added volume) states: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this title applies to transactions in goods; ...
617 F.2d at 359.
451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). For a case reaching the opposite result of Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster see Southern Concrete Service, Inc. v. Mableton
Construction, Inc. 407 F. Supp. 581 (ND. Ga. 1975).
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explained and supplemented by course of dealing and usage of
trade9 no obligation was placed upon it to accept the minimum
quantities and prices stated in the contract with Royster. The
Fourth Circuit held that U.C.C. § 2-202 permitted Columbia to
introduce evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade to explain and supplement the express language in the contract." The
court stated that under the U.C.C., in contrast to the traditional
parol evidence rule,1' a finding of ambiguity is not required for
VA. CODE § 8.1-205 states:
Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade-(l) A course of dealing is a
sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting 'their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify
an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction
in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as
facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written
trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the
court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in
the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
terms of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable
express terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and
course of dealing controls usage of trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to
that part of the performance.
10 451 F.2d at 9. U.C.C. § 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) oi by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
" Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts described the parol evidence
rule in the following manner: "When the terms of a contract have been embodied
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introduction of parol evidence. 2 Rather, "the test of admissibility is not whether the contract appears on its face to be complete
in every detail, but whether the proferred evidence of course of
dealing and trade usage reasonably can be construed as consistent with the express terms of the agreement.""3
The record in Brnswick demonstrated that each party attached a different meaning to the term "F.A.S."'" It contained
numerous instances where each party viewed the term "F.A.S.
Norfolk, Virginia" in a manner inconsistent with the statutory
definition. 5 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court
erred by refusing to allow the parties to go outside the written
document and bring in evidence as to course of dealing when
determining whether the parties had otherwise agreed as to the
meaning of the term "F.A.S." The extrinsic evidence of course of
dealing was seen as consistent with the terms of the contract
because it helped to explain the true meaning given the term by
the parties."'
The court in Brunswick correctly applied the U.C.C's liberalized parol evidence rule. U.C.C. § 2-202(a) allows the introduction of information as to course of dealing and usage of trade
which would be excluded under the traditional parol evidence
rule. West Virginia has also adopted the U.C.C. and its liberalized parol evidence rule contained in § 2-202(a)." However, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not yet considered

in a writing to which both parties have assented as the definite and complete
statement thereof, parol evidence of antecedent agreements, negotiations, and
understandings is not admissible for the purpose of varying or contradicting the

contract so embodied." A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (One Volume Edition) § 573 (rev.
ed. 1952). See also 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

239 (1973);

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§§ 237, 240 (1932).

11451 F.2d at 9.
'3 Id.

'

617 F.2d at 361.

15Id.

Except for limited circumstances, parol evidence is not admissible
unless consistent with the written terms of a particular agreement under U.C.C. §
2-202. In this case the court did not seriously consider the consistency requirement. For more on this consistency requirement see Wittenberg, Section 2-202: A
1,Id.

Different Approach to Consistency, 12 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 87 (1978).
1, W. VA. CODE § 46-2-202 (1967 Replacement Volume).
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the issue of whether § 2-202(a) permits the introduction of extrinsic evidence of course of dealing or usage of trade when the
contract is not ambiguous." The fact that § 46-2-202(a) of the
West Virginia Code is identical to § 8.2-202(a) of the Virginia
Code leads to the conclusion that West Virginia would follow the
Fourth Circuit's holdings in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. and
Brunswick. Therefore, regardless of whether the contract is ambiguous, evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade would
be admissible when the evidence indicates that the parties may
have otherwise agreed to the meaning of a contract term.
This liberalization of the parol evidence rule will have a
significant effect upon the sources available to judges attempting to interpret sales contracts. It will also force businessmen to
re-examine "boilerplate" contract provisions and the effect that
admissibility of course of dealing and usage of trade may have
on interpreting these provisions.
Louis F. Williams, Jr.
III.

ACCRUAL OF INDEMNITY ACTIONS UNDER
UCC SECTION 2-725

In Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Dickerson, Inc. , a subcontractor which had been found liable for the defective construction and workmanship of a roof it had installed sought indemnification from the manufacturer of the roofing materials.'
" However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Ashland Oil
Inc., v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1976) held that parol evidence may be
received in order to explain or supplement the writings forming an agreement
with reference to a course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance in

order to eliminate vagueness or ambiguity in the agreement.

1 619 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1980).
The factual background is as follows: On April 21, 1969 Walker Manufacturing Co. (hereinafter Walker) entered into an agreement with Dickerson, Inc.
(hereinafter Dickerson) for the construction of a warehouse. Edward's Roofing
and Sheet Metal Company (hereinafter Edwards) was in turn employed by
Dickerson to install the roof on the building. After the building was completed in
May 1970 the roof developed leaks. Edwards made various efforts to correct the
problem, but ceased such efforts in May 1971 when the one year warranty of
workmanship it had given Dickerson and Walker expired. During the period from
June 1971 to May 1975 Walker and Dickerson entered into various negotiations
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The, manufacturer, relying upon Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) section 2-725, argued that the subcontractor's claim was
time barred because it was brought more than four years after
the date of delivery of the materials.' The district court rejected
which resulted in several attempts by Dickerson to correct the problem. Despite
the fact that Dickerson spent over $75,000 in the effort, its attempts to repair the
roof were largely unsuccessful.
On August 6, 1975 Walker filed a diversity action in federal district court
against Dickerson and its surety, Seaboard Surety Co. (hereinafter Seaboard),
alleging that Dickerson had breached its contract by the improper construction of
the roof. Dickerson and Seaboard in turn filed third-party complaints against the
subcontractor Edwards, the architect, Piedmont Engineering and Architects, Inc.
(hereinafter Piedmont), and the manufacturer of the roofing materials, The
Celotex Corp. (hereinafter Celotex). Edwards cross-claimed against both Piedmont and Celotex.
Prior to trial all parties moved for summary judgment. Seaboard's motion
was granted and it was dismissed from the case. The district judge severed the
third-party and cross-claims, and the principal case was then tried befor a jury in
July 1976. At trial the court granted Dickerson's motion for a directed verdict,
holding that Walker's action was time barred by the North Carolina three year
statute of limitations. On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed concluding that
there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to consider the application of the
doctrine of estoppel to Dickerson's defense, and therefore the district court had
erred in directing a verdict. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Dickerson, Inc., 560 F.2d 1184 (4th
Cir. 1977). On remand the district court found that Dickerson had breached its
contract with Walker and was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.
Dickerson appealed.
At the trial of the third-party claims the jury found that Edwards had
breached its subcontract with Dickerson, and that Dickerson was entitled to
recover $194,000 from Edwards. The jury also found that despite the negligence
of Piedmont and Celotex, Dickerson was estopped from asserting any claim
against them. With respect to Edwards' cross-claim the jury found that Edwards
was entitled to recover $97,000 from Celotex and $48.500 from Piedmont. Dickerson, Edwards, and Celotex appealed.
In addition to deciding the indemnity issue discussed in the text, the Fourth
Circuit also decided that the indemnity clause in Edwards' roofing subcontract
supported the judgment in favor of Dickerson for $194,000, and that the evidence
was sufficient to support the finding that Dickerson breached its contract with
Walker, and was estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations.
I U.C.C. § 2-725, as codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725 (1979 Cum. Supp.)
provides:
(1)An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original
agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less
than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of war-
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this argument and held that under North Carolina law where
one person's liability for a tort or breach of warranty committed
by another is secondary, the statute of limitations does not commence to run against his right to indemnity from the party
primarily liable until damages have been paid to the injured party.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
U.C.C. was not intended to shield manufacturers of defective
products from indemnity claims made by their purchasers more
than four years from the date of sale, and that the district court,
therefore, had correctly applied the North Carolina law as articulated in Hager v. Brewer Equipment Co.,4 and as previously
recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Premier Corp. v. Economic
Research Analysts.5
In Hager, a worker was injured when an elevator malfunctioned. An action was brought against the furnisher of the
elevator, who subsequently filed a third-party action against the
seller of the elevator for indemnity, based upon negligence and
breach of warranty. The court held that the statute of limitations would not begin to run against the indemnity claim until
the furnisher was required to pay damages.
The vast majority of jurisdictions agree with the position
taken by the North Carolina court in Hager that the statute of
limitations for an indemnity action does not begin to run until a
judgment has been paid.6 Although Walker is the first case
ranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
17 N.C. App. 489, 195 S.E.2d 54 (1973).
578 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1978).
52 N.C. L. REV. 921 (1974). For a list of cases from other jurisdictions in accord with the Hager rule, see Hager v. Brewer Equipment Co., 17 N.C. App. at

493-94, 195 S.E.2d at 57. See also 41 AM. JuR. 2d, Indemnity, § 39 (1968); and 51
AM. Jut. 2d, Limitations of Actions, § 287 (1970). It is important to distinguish
these cases involving a right to indemnification from cases involving the right to
subrogation. In the latter instance it is usually held that a subrogee can acquire
no more rights against a third party than are held by its subrogor. Accordingly an
insurer subrogated to the rights of its insured is subject to the same statute of
limitations as the insured, and the cause of action will be deemed to accrue at the
time of injury, not at the time benefits are paid. See, e.g., Great American Ins.
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specifically dealing with the period of limitation contained in
U.C.C. section 2-725 as applied against a claim for indemnity, the
same reasons which justify the application of the indemnity rule
against other state statutes of limitation, also justify its use in a
case governed by the U.C.C.7
Essentially two policy reasons justify the exception of an indemnity action from the normal statute of limitations: First, a
tortfeasor should be held accountable for his wrongful acts; and
second, it is wrong for one whose negligence is only secondary
to bear the liability for an injury attributable to the primary
negligence of another.' Furthermore, claims for indemnification
are generally viewed as separate and distinct from claims that
arise at the time of breach of warranty.' The holding in Walker
that the U.C.C. was not intended to shield manufacturers of
defective products from indemnity claims made more than four
years after the date of sale is an implicit acceptance of these
policies.
Although the application of the Hager indemnity rule in a
commercial case otherwise governed by the U.C.C. frustrates
the policy of the U.C.C. to provide commercial certainty, the
rule is not unduly burdensome in light of the ability of a manufacturer to avoid prolonged susceptibility to a potential indemnity action by a valid contractual limitation of the time within
which a buyer may commence an action. As a general rule when
the parties are involved in an arms-length transaction for a private purpose, and when the language of the contract and the intent of the parties are clear, courts will normally uphold a contract which limits the time of potential liability or which
reallocates the risk of either party's negligence."
In Walker the Fourth Circuit joined the majority of jurisdicCo. v. United States, 575 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1978); Williams v. Globe Indem. Co.,
507 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
' Although the U.C.C. had not been adopted in North Carolina at the time of
the sale in Hager, the court indicated that its decision would not have been different if U.C.C. § 2-275 had been applicable. See Walker Mfg. Co. v. Dickerson,
Inc., 619 F.2d at 310.
8 See 52 N.C. L. REV. 921 (1974).

See generally 51 AM. JuR. 2d, supra note 24; and Hager, 17 N.C. App. at
494, 195 S.E.2d at 58.
10 See 52 N.C. L. REV. at 926-30 and cases cited therein.
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tions in deciding that, in the absence of such contractual provisions, the policies which support the exemption of indemnity
claims from the normal statute of limitations are superior to the
U.C.C. policy of commercial certainty.
John H. Bicknell

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT: REGULATION OF
STUDENT EXPRESSION

In Williams v. Spencer,' student editors of an "alternative"
school newspaper brought suit against the Montgomery County
(Maryland) Board of Education and various school officials for
declaratory and injunctive relief, damages and attorney's fees
for an alleged interference with their first amendment rights.
The plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the school authorities
from restraining the distribution of their non-school sponsored
publication, Joint Effort, Issue 2, and from enforcing the Publication Guidelines of the Montgomery County school system.
The students published and distributed the issues of Joint
Effort on the school grounds with the express permission of the
principal. They were not required to seek prepublication or predistribution approval of the contents. Ten to twenty minutes
after the sale of the second issue began, the building monitor
confiscated the remaining copies and took them to the principal.
The principal unheld the seizure and banned any further distribution of that issue on school property.
The principal followed guidelines prescribed under the Student Rights and Responsibilities Policy and within two school
days stated the reasons for his action. First a cartoon depicting
the building monitor in western clothing was found in violation
of publication guidelines in that a "member of the staff [was]
depicted in derogatory terms with clear indications of racial
overtones."2 Second, the promotion of drug paraphernalia in the

' 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 1203.
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paper through an advertisement by a local headshop "encourages actions which endanger the health and safety of students,"'
also in violation of the publication guidelines.
After unsuccessful administrative appeals to the area superintendent, where an informal hearing was held, and to the superintendent of schools, the students filed suit claiming that the
seizure and continued restraint against distribution violated
first amendment rights and that the school's regulatory scheme
was facially invalid.
The district court rejected the argument that the health and
safety regulations were so vague that they were invalid under
the first amendment. It also found that the school system's administrative appeal process was not unconstitutionally lengthy.
The district court held that the advertisement for the headshop
gave the principal the right, under the health and safety regulation, to halt the distribution of the paper The students appealed.
The Fourth Circuit, at the outset of its opinion, noted that
the first amendment rights of school students are not necessarily equaly to those of adults,' and that the "constitutional right
to free speech of public secondary school students may be
modified or curtailed by school regulations 'reasonably designed
to adjust these rights to the needs of the school environment.' "6
This theory of law has been utilized by other circuits in dealing
with first amendment freedoms in the school system."
The court held that the health and safety regulation was not
impermissibly vague. Noting that a prior restraint regulation
"must contain precise criteria sufficiently spelling out what is
forbidden so that a reasonably intelligent student will know

Id.
Id. at 1204. Since the district court found that the health and safety regula-

tion provided sufficient justification for the principal to halt distribution of the
paper, it did not address the constitutionality of the regulation which allowed a

school to halt distribution of libelous material. Id. at 1204, n.6.
"Id. at 1205 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
. Id. at 1205 (citing Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971)).
See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Butts
v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Bd. of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
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what he may write and what he may not write,"8 the court
reasoned that because there was a large number of materials
that may be found to encourage actions which endanger the
health or safety of students the regulation described as explicitly as is required the kind of material which would allow
the principal to halt distribution." The court observed:
The First Amendment rights of the students must yield to
the superior interest of the school in seeing that materials that
encourage actions which endanger the health and safety of students are not distributed on school property. Because the only
type of material regulated by the guideline is material that
must yield to the school's superior interest, we think the guideline does not prohibit constitutionally protected conduct of the
students. Thus, the guideline is not unconstitutional on its
face. 0
The court affirmed the district court's decision to take
judicial notice of the fact that an advertisement encouraging the
use of drugs encourages actions which endanger the health or
safety of students." Thus, the court held that the principal had
correctly applied the health and safety regulation in this case.
The court also noted that the fact that the advertisement
was purely commercial speech was an additional reason in upholding the restraint, observing that commercial speech does
not enjoy the same degree of protection as other types of
speech.12
The court further held that the administrative appeals procedure provided for in the regulations meets the requirement
that there be an "adequate and prompt appeals procedure."'"
The time limits were held to be reasonable on their face. The
principal had two days to justify his actions, the area superintendent had ten days to make his decision (five, if after a hearing) and the superintendent of schools had five days. These lira-

622 F.2d at 1205 (citing Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th
Cir. 1973)).
O Id.
8

10Id.
:1 Id.

Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1207.
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its, along with the ten day limits to appeal the decisions of the
principal and assistant superintendent discouraged delay in the
administrative appeals.1 The court emphasized, however, that
there was no need to submit the publication for prior approval
and that the students were free to distribute the paper off of
school property, thus lessening the impact of the administrative
appeals process. 15
David B. Thomas
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE VALIDITY OF
NEUTRAL STATE REGULATIONS WHICH

INHIBIT RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

In Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc.,' the Baltimore chapter of the International Society for
Kirshna Consciousness (ISKCON) sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 against the Maryland State
Fair, maintaining that their "booth rule," which restricted
ISKCON to a booth in their solicitation of funds and distribution
of literature, unconstitutionally infringed upon the practice of
their religion in violation of the first amendment. The district
court found that the "booth rule" of the fair constituted state action on the part of Maryland for purposes of section 1983 but
concluded that neither the "booth rule" nor its enforcement
denied plaintiffs their first amendment rights.3 Plaintiffs and
defendants both appealed this decision.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that part of
the decision of the district court which found state action on the
14 Id.
15Id.

1

628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980).

2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
3

628 F.2d at 283.
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part of Maryland but reversed the holding that the rule did not
infringe upon the first amendment rights of the members of
ISKCON.' In their state action analysis the court noted that the
fair received a substantial subsidy from the state of Maryland,
the state fair board was a statutorily created body, and the use
of the state funds was conditioned on compliance with the rules
and regulations of the fair board.' The role of the state in subsidizing and regulating the fair was sufficient to find the requisite state action for purposes of section 1983.6
In their discussion of the booth rule, the court observed that
it had been in effect since the early 196 0 's. The rule required all
persons, organizations and groups, whether commercial, civic,
political or religious, wishing to solicit contributions, sell products or distribute literature, to do so from a booth.7 The members of ISKCON are required to practice a ritual known as Sankirtan. This practice requires the dissemination of religious
literature and the solicitation of funds to support the missionary
programs of ISKCON. The donations and book distribution in
exchange for contributions are the principal means of financial
support for ISKCON.8
The Fourth Circuit concluded from a study of Sankirtan that
it is a genuine and necessary ritual in the practice of the beliefs
of ISKCON. The religion requires -its members to approach
other individuals to proselytise and solicit contributions., The
court further concluded that "enforcement of the [booth] rule
may be a complete abrogation of religious expresion by ISKCON
members. The legal question is whether plaintiffs in the practice
of that ritual may be restricted to a booth or whether such a restriction impermissibly burdens the exercise of their First
u
Amendment rights.""
The court utilized the rule articulated by the United States
1 in testing the constituSupreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner"
Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 285.
o Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
O Id. at 285.
O

Id.
1'374 U.S. 398 (1963).

10
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tionality of the booth rule. Under this standard the rule must be
justified by a compelling state interest and it must be shown
that the state aim cannot be accomplished by less restrictive
means. 2 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit
3
almost factually identical with
decision in ISKCON v. Bowen,"
the instant case, that the state had failed to show a legitimate
state interest in maintaining the public safety through control of
the crowd, noting that a fear or apprehension of such a danger is
not a sufficient state interest to restrict first amendment freedoms.1'
The court noted that in the very nature of a fair there is no
expectation of privacy because of the large numbers of people.
They recognized that the first amendment protects unpopular as
well as irritating expression, 6 concluding that in a public place
such as.a fair a person is fully capable of refusing any solicitation and continuing on his way. 6 The court looked to the less
burdensome alternative of the penal laws for fraud to control
the solicitations of groups.17
The decision of the Fourth Circuit was not an absolute
guarantee to ISKCON and other groups to exercise their constitutional rights of religion outside of the booth. The court cautioned that the result may change "should a marked change in
circumstances be shown."' 8 This part of.the opinion recognizes
the state's right to regulate conduct within the sphere of the
first amendment when legitimate state interests are endangered.
David B. Thomas

III.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN

On December 6, 1974, Naomi Faye Hall, a minor, was hit
"repeatedly and violently" with a homemade paddle by her
,2628 F.2d at 286.
I 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
628 F.2d at 286.
"Id. (citing Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
Id.
17 Id.
" Id. at 287.
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grade school teacher, G. Garrison Tawney. The paddling was
authorized by the school's principal, Bernard Caldwell. Naomi
and her parents filed a four count complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia against
Tawney, Claywell, the superintendent of the county schools, and
the members of the County Board of Education.1
The district court dismissed the entire action in response to
the defendant's motion under rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court based its holding on
a recent Supreme Court opinion which had been decided after
commencment of the plaintiffs action. The Supreme Court held
in Ingraham v. Wright that where state tort and criminal law
provided sufficient remedies against school officials for excessive applications of corporal punishment a school child's liberty interest was sufficiently protected to meet the procedural
requirements of the due process clause.' It also held that the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
was applicable only to individuals convicted of crime and,
therefore, could not be invoked by school children subjected to
corporal punishment.'
The plaintiffs in their appeal of the district court's decision
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that the holding in Ingraham foreclosed the procedural due process and cruel
and unusual punishment elements of their claim. However,
Naomi and her parents continued to assert their individual substantive due process claims.
The parents' primary argument in support of their claim
was that "Naomi's paddling violated [their] right ...

to deter-

I The plaintiff's action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The four counts
of the complaint alleged that the paddling had violated: 1) Naomi's procedural due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment, 2) Naomi's substantive due process rights under the fourteenth amendment, 3) Naomi's right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment, and 4) the substantive due process rights of Naomi's parents.
2 430 U.S. 651, 674-83 (1977). "[Ihe district court found Ingrahamdispositive
of the procedural due process claim because West Virginia law-as had been expressly noted in Ingraham-affordedessentially the same common law civil and
criminal remedies as did Florida law in Ingraham." Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
609 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fourth Circuit agreed with this conclusion. Id.
- 430 U.S. at 659-71.
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mine the means by which Naomi could be disciplined.' The
Fourth Circuit noted that the issue presented by the parents
had already been decided "adversely" to the parents5 in the case
of Baker v. Owen,6 a case recently decided by a three-judge
district court and summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The district court noted in Baker that "we cannot allow the
wishes of a parent to restrict school officials' discretion in
deciding the methods to be used in accomplishing the not just
legitimate, but essential purpose of maintaining discipline."7
The Fourth Circuit held that "[e]ven without the imprimatur
of the Supreme Court" it would have been in agreement with
the holding in Baker.! The court believed that the school's interests in maintaining order and discipline outweighed any
rights of particular parents in dictating the form, if any, by
which their child should be disciplined.' Moreover, the court
found that the parents' rights did not increase proportionally
with the severity of the punishment. The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the parents'
claim.10
The court was left with resolution of the issue of whether
Naomi had a substantive due process right to be free from certain forms of corporal punishment. The court noted that the
Supreme Court's holding in Ingraham had expressly left this
issue unresolved. In resolving the issue, the Fourth Circuit
started with the proposition that "disciplinary corporal punishment does not per se violate the public school child's substantive
due process rights."12 The plaintiffs argued that while corporal

' Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 610 (1980). Naomi's parents had informed
"school officials, including Tawney, that they did not want Naomi corporally
punished." Id.
SId.
'395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (three judge court), affd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).

395 F. Supp. at 301. The Supreme Court in Ingraham cited its summary affirmance of Baker as standing for the proposition "that parental approval of corporal punishment is not constitutionally required." 430 U.S. at 662 n.22.
621 F.2d at 610.
'Id.
10 Id.

" Id. at 610-11.
" Id. at 611. This proposition was based on the fact that the court believed
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punishment did not constitute a per se violation of a fundamental constitutional right the constitutional right would be violated
where the severity of the punishment inflicted exceeds that
necessary to maintain order the schools."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument
in its decision in Ingraham v. Wright.4 It held that federal constitutional rights could not be made to hinge on the question of
"whether in a particular instance of misconduct five licks would
have been more appropriate punishment then [sic] ten licks.""
The Fifth Circuit Court also rested its decisions on the fact that
civil or criminal action could be taken in the state courts
"against a teacher who has excessively punished a child."'"
The Fourth Circuit rejected the holding of the Fifth Circuit
in Ingraham. It noted that "relief under § 1983 does not depend
upon the unavailability of state remedies, but is supplementary
to them."'7 The court believed that a constitutional right existed
in this situation in addition to the rights and remedies afforded
by state law.
The Fourth Circuit defined this substantive due process
right as "the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of
personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal,
demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of
the court."'8 The court found this right "grounded" in the substantive due process right which has been protected in a series
of police brutality cases."

that corporal punishment, in some instances at least, "is reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest in maintaining order in the schools." Id. at 612.
IS Id. at 612.
, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), affd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
11525 F.2d at 917.
"Id.
621 F.2d at 612.
"Id. at 613.
Id The court cited the following cases as examples of where the right had

been found to exist in the police brutality context: Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (forcible use of stomach pump by police); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (unprovoked beating of pretrial detainee by guard); and
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1970) ("reckless" pistol shooting of
suspect by police).
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The court believed that the appropriate inquiry into
whether this right had been violated involved balancing the
need for the use of corporal punishment against the force applied and the severity of the resulting injury. 0 The motivation
of the individual administering the corporal punishment was
also seen as an appropriate subject of the inquiry.2 Thus, if the
punishment was "inspired by malice or sadism rather than a
merely careless or unwise excess of zeal" and the force with
which it was applied caused injury the severity of which was out
of proportion to the reason which gave rise to the need for corporal punishment, the court believed that it could properly be
found that the substantive due process rights of the school child
had been violated.22
The Fourth Circuit found that on its face it could not be held
that Naomi Hall's complaint failed to state a claim for which
relief could be granted.' It, therefore, remanded this portion of
the plaintiffs' original complaint to the district court for further
consideration in light of its decision articulating a newly-found
substantive constitutional right existing under the rubric of the
due process clause.2
Thomas H. Fluharty

621 F.2d at 613.

SId.
SId.
"' Id. at 614.
u The court held that the allegations of the remaining complaint did not
"state substantive due process claims under § 1983 against any of the other defendant than Tawney and Claywell." Id. at 615. Consequently, the court affirmed the
dismissal of Naomi's substantive due process claim against all the defendants ex-

cept Tawney and Claywell. Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW
I.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: BAD ADVICE
AND THE "COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES" RULE

The decision in Strader v. Garrison' clearly indicates that
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals will rigorously uphold a
criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
Strader had been sentenced in 1968 to a forty-five to fifty-five
year indeterminate term for burglary and robbery. He escaped
from prison in 1974, and after recapture, was tried in 1975 for offenses allegedly committed while he was at large. A plea bargain was agreed upon that would have enabled Strader, after
pleading guilty to both of the offenses charged, to serve thirty
years for one charge concurrently with his prior sentence and to
serve five to ten years on another charge, to be served consecutively to the 1968 sentence. Strader was greatly concerned
that the thirty-year sentence would postpone his parole eligibility date, but his attorney assured him it would not. Strader
pleaded guilty, then discovered that his attorney had been incorrect. In fact, published regulations of the North Carolina Department of Correction clearly requireda recomputation in the case
of concurrent sentences of the time to be served before eligibility for parole could be determined.2
The district court granted the defendant's habeas corpus
petition, which attacked his conviction on the ground of bad advice by counsel. The court found that "his parole eligibility date
was of great importance to Strader and he would not have
entered his guilty plea if he had been correctly advised about
the effect of the new sentences upon that eligibility date."' The
State of North Carolina appealed the decision on the ground
that the guilty plea was not involuntary in a constitutional
sense, since parole eligibility is but a "collateral consequence" of
a plea, of which a defendant need not be informed before entering a plea of guilty.'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of
1 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979).
2 Id. at 63.
'Id.
4Id.
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the district court. It concluded that the collateral consequence
rule would not apply in a situation where the facts of the case
were such that the defendant entered an improvident plea based
upon bad advice of counsel.'
The court did state that parole eligibility dates are "collateral consequences of the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed" but added the significant phrase
"if he does not inquire, ' thus strictly limiting the collateral consequences rule to a situation where the defendant has not requested advice. Where a defendant does request advice, is grossly misinformed, and then relies on that misinformation, his plea
is not voluntarily made; and he has been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.'
On remand, the court advised North Carolina that if it could
reduce the sentence to such an extent that it would have no
adverse impact on the defendant's parole eligibility date, the
blunder of counsel would be reduced to harmless error. Otherwise, the defendant would have to be released subject to retrial
by the state.'
In reaching this decision, the court rejected the decisions
reached by two other circuits which had held that the collateral
consequences rule was applicable to situations similar to the one
which existed in Strader. In United States v. Parrino' an alien
was assured by his attorney that he would not be deported if he
pleaded guilty, when in fact a guilty plea was a ground for deportation. A panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to allow him to withdraw his plea. The second case, United
States v. Sambro, ° also involved alien deportation and reliance
by the alien on his counsel's advice. Since deportation was only a
"collateral consequence" of the sentence, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found the plea voluntary and
denied relief.

5Id.

Id. at 65.
SId.
'Id.
o 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954).
"454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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In dismissing these two decisions as "aberrations," the court
stressed that neither case had been analyzed from the perspective of determining whether effective assistance of counsel had
been provided.11 In fact, a later Second Circuit case, United
States ex rel Hill v. Ternullo, reached the same conclusion as
the Fourth Circuit in Strader that bad advice given a defendant
and relied upon should be grounds for relief, without any mention of its previous decision in Parrino.
In determining that the bad advice given the defendant by
his counsel deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right
to the assistance of counsel, the Fourth Circuit applied the test
for measuring the competence of counsel adopted by the majority of the circuits in one form or another: the "reasonable
criminal lawyer standard."" The issue under this test is whether
a reasonably competent lawyer could be expected to know of the
recomputation requirement set forth in writing by the North
Carolina Department of Correction. The court held that a reasonably competent criminal lawyer should have known that concurrent sentences would have extended the time necessary to
become eligible for parole, and1 that the defendant had detrimentally relied on the bad advice.

4

In 1975 the Fourth Circuit held in Hammond v. United

611 F.2d at 64.

'2510 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1975).
" United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584
F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir.
1978); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440
U.S. 974 (1979); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Akridge v. Hopper, 545 F.2d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied 431 U.S. 941 (1977); United States v. Toney 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 838 (1976); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey,
510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970).
At least two circuits still adhere to the "farce and mockery" standard set
forth in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 889;
Cole v. Quick, 589 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) but see United States v. Tolliver, 669
F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 257-58 (10th Cir.
1979).
was not called on to make a
1, The court noted that the attorney
"prediction:' He could have easily discovered the applicable rule had he only looked
in the published material. 611 F.2d at 63.
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8 that bad advice concerning the direct consequence of a
States"
plea would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In Hammond, a young defendant was induced to enter a plea bargaining
agreement on the erroneous advice that if he did not do so, he
could be subject to a ninety to ninety-five year sentence when,
in fact, the defendant could only have received a maximum fiftyfive year sentence. The court held that the guilty plea was involuntary, and that he had been denied the effective aid of counsel."6

The court in Straderbelieved that the crucial element in the
Hammond decision was that the defendant has been "misled by
erroneous advice" not that the misinformation had concerned
the direct consequences of his pleas." It therefore concluded
that it was a natural progression to hold that where a defendant
has been "misled by erroneous advice," even when the advice
concerns a collateral matter about which the defendant would
not ordinarily need to be informed to make a voluntary and intelligent decision concerning his plea, he has been denied his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel."
Melody Helm Gaidrich
II.

CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR BINDING THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT TO A PLEA BARGAIN

In United States v. McIntosh,' the defendant was charged
by the State of Virginia with running a gambling operation on
his business premises. Before his appearance in the state court,
his defense attorneys and the prosecutor met and entered into a
plea bargain. The defendant then entered his plea of guilty in
the state court. At the evidentiary hearing for the federal tax
evasion charge which stemmed from the gambling operations,
McIntosh contended that the state prosecutors had promised
him that if he pleaded guilty, they would pay the $3,000 which
had been seized as evidence for the state to the Internal
,' 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975).
18 Id. at 18-19.

" 611 F.2d at 65.
1Id.

1 612 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1979).
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Revenue Service "to clear [appellant] with the IRS," 2 and that no
federal prosecution would result. At no time did the defendant's
attorneys contact a federal official to attempt to verify this
bargain. The defendant presented no evidence to show that the
state prosecutor had authority granted from any federal official,
nor was there any evidence to prove that the federal authorities
had done any act which would have clothed the state prosecutors with apparent authority to act.'
The state prosecutor denied that he had made any promise
to waive federal prosecution, and testified that he promised only
that the money would be turned over to the IRS to satisfy any
jeopardy assessments against the defendant. The IRS agent who
had been contacted by the state prosecutor corroborated this
testimony.' The district court accepted the state prosecutor's
version of the bargain and held that there had been no promise
made, and that even if the promise had been made it would not
have bound the federal authorities, because the state prosecutor
had no authority to make it.'
The defendant appealed, contending that the finding of the
district court was clearly erroneous, and further, that "the very
fact a state prosecutor might make a promise to prevent federal
prosecution is sufficient to bar it so long as the promise was
made and was reasonably believed by his attorneys."' The
defendant relied on Cooper v. United States,' a Fourth Circuit
case which posits generally that under appropriate circumstances a constitutional right to the enforcement of plea proposals may arise before any technical contract has been formed
"on the basis alone of expectations reasonably formed in reliance upon the honor of [the] Government in making and abiding
by its proposals."8
The court distinguished Cooper from the instant case
because in Cooper a promise had been made by a person with

' Id. at 836.

Id. at 836-37.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id.
7 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979).
3

8

Id. at 18.
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authority to bind the government.' The promise was made, then
withdrawn before the defense attorney could convey to the prosecutor the defendant's acceptance of the bargain. The court held
that the technical offer and acceptance rules of contract law
should not work to defeat the bargain where its defeat could impair the defense attorney's credibility and affect the defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel. 10
The court refused to extend Cooper to allow the subjective
belief of a defendant that a promise was made by one without
authority to make it to create a valid plea bargain. The court
believed that "where the content of a plea bargain and the authority for its offer are at issue, [the] traditional precepts of contract and agency should apply."' This conclusion is supported
by decisions in other jurisdictions.
In United States v. Long, 2 an Illinois Bureau of Investigation agent employed by the State of Illinois led the defendant to
believe he was authorized to represent the federal government
and allegedly promised that, if the defendant would plead guilty
to the state charge, the agent would not turn over a gun seized
as evidence to the federal authorities to be used as a basis for
federal charges. The agent insisted that he agreed only to make
a recommendation to the U.S. Attorney's Office and advise them
of the defendant's cooperation, and that in any event, the defendant had not cooperated fully. The district court held that an
agreement did exist and dismissed the federal indictment. The
court of appeals reversed, noting that the district court cited no
precedent for imposing an agency relationship between the
federal government and the state agent.
While, as the district court said, an IBI agent who investigates,
arrests and charges a defendant with an offense which may be
prosecuted federally may well be regarded by the accused as an
agent of the United States, the federal Government may not be
held responsible for his agreement when no agency relationship

' See Judge Phillips concurring opinion which explains the majority's characterization of Cooper.
10594 F.2d at 16-18.
" 612 F.2d at 837.
12511 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
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in fact exists and the Government has no actual knowledge of
the agreement.'3
United States v. Lombardozzi"4 involved an FBI agent who
was a member of a prosecutorial team who conceded that he had
convinced the defendant that he was speaking for the Assistant
United States Attorney in plea negotiations, when he was not.
The defendant claimed that the agent promised him that his federal sentence could run concurrently with his state sentence and
that the defendant would spend no time in a federal institution.
The court of appeals found that "while Kinally [the agent] may
have 'conveyed' the 'idea of a concurrent sentence,' this falls
short of amounting to a promise; he had made a suggestion, not
an assurance. Indeed, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing
indicates that appellant knew Kinally could not bind the Department of Justice."'15
8
In United States v. Padilla,'
the defendant attempted to enforce a plea bargain made at the state level against the federal
government, on the grounds that the state official who made the
agreement later became an Assistant United States Attorney
and prosecuted the case in federal court. The court said that
since the United States was not a party to the New Mexico prosecution, the government's power to enforce its criminal laws
could not be affected by any proceedings in a state court."

The latest case involving a question of authority came from
the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Hudson,'18 where a federal
agent promised that charges would be dropped if the defendant
cooperated in the apprehension of suppliers of counterfeit bills.
The issue was whether the United States Attorney's Office was
bound by the acts and promises of other federal agents who
were not within the United States Attorney's office. The court
held that fundamental fairness did not require the United States
Attorney's office to be bound, and cited the Lombardozzi case as

Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
1,467 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
"Id. at 162.
" 589 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1978).
"d.
" 609 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
13
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authority as well as another Ninth Circuit case19 where the investigator was acting in a private capacity.
It is clear then, that before the federal government may be
bound by a plea bargain, two conditions must exist: (1)a promise
must be made, and (2) by someone with actual authority to make
such a promise. A mere subjective belief on the part of the
defendant that either one or both exists will not be sufficient to
creat a bargain, and it appears that the burden has been squarely placed on the defense counsel to ascertain both the existence
of the bargain and the validity of the authority.
The district court in McIntosh found that a promise had not
in fact been made. This alone would have been a sufficient basis
for denying relief, yet the court went on to say in dicta that
even if a promise had been made, no authority existed and the
federal government would not be bound.
Melody Helm Gaidrich
III.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION TO

WARRANT REQUIREMENT

In U.S. v. Truong Dinh Hung,1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed an issue that the
Supreme Court has thus far left open in the area of fourth
amendment warrant requirements. Truong Dinh Hung was a
Vietnamese citizen living in the United States. Truong had
enlisted the help of a Vietnamese-American woman to carry
packages for him to representatives of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam in Paris. Unknown to Truong, this woman was a confidental informant employed by the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. She regularly kept
these agencies informed of Truong's activities. After learning
that Truong was transmitting classified documents to Paris, the
government tapped Truong's telephone and bugged his apartment in order to locate his source of information. The taps and
bugs were installed without court authorization or warrant. The
1"United States v. Stevens, 601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S.
917 (1979).

' 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
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government subsequently brought criminal charges against
Truong for espionage and other crimes. Upon conviction Truong
appealed on the ground that the surveillance conducted by the
government violated the fourth amendment, because the surveillance was conducted without first obtaining a warrant.
Truong argued that all the evidence uncovered through that surveillance should have been suppressed.'
The fourth amendment provides that all searches and
seizures must be reasonable and that warrants may only issue
based upon a showing of probable cause.' It is well settled that
wiretapping constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment.' A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is a per se fourth amendment
violation except for a few specifically established and welldefined exceptions.' A warrant need not be obtained where the
person to be searched consents8 or where exigent circumstances
make it impractical to obtain a warrant.' Examples of exigent
circumstances that the courts have recognized include: where
the officer is responding to an emergency or is in hot pursuit of
a fleeing felon; or where the evidence is in danger of being
destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction.
In Truong Dinh Hung, neither of these exceptions applied.
Truong did not consent to the surveillance and there was no
emergency situation requiring prompt action. The wiretapping
continued for more than one year. It would not have been an undue burden on the government to obtain a warrant prior to con2 Id. at 912.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
, Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471
3

(196a); Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
' Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(19q3).
' Bumper v. U.S., 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
' Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30

(1970).
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ducting the wiretapping. There was also no danger that the information or evidence wias about to be destroyed.
Recognizing that the surveillance in this case did not fit into
any of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,
the Fourth Circuit formulated a new exception-the "foreign intelligence" exception.' This new theory relieves the government
of the burden of seeking a warrant when the object of the surveillance is a foreign power, its agent, or collaborator.' The
surveillance also must be conducted primarily for foreign intelligence areas." If the primary reason for the surveillance is to
form the basis for a criminal prosecution, then a warrant would
be required."
The Fourth Circuit based its decision upon the reasoning of
United States v. United States District Court.12 In that case the
Supreme Court required the government to secure a warrant
prior to conducting domestic security surveillance. They
reached that decision using the following balancing test:
If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic
security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question
is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression
may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant would unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed
against it."3
In applying this standard to the foreign intelligence situation,
the Fourth Circuit found that, unlike the domestic security situation, the needs of the government were so compelling that requiring a warrant would unduly frustrate the executive branch
of government in carrying out its foreign affairs responsibilities." The court also said that attempts to counter foreign
threats to the national security require the utmost stealth,

629 F.2d at 912-19.
'Id. at 915.
10Id.

11Id.
12

407 U.S. 297 (1972).

Id. at 315.

629 F.2d at 913.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

57

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

speed, and secrecy."5 Furthermore, the executive branch possesses great expertise in the area of foreign affairs and is in a much
better position than the judiciary to determine the necessity of
surveillance."6
The Fourth Circuit's basis for establishing this new foreign
intelligence exception rests entirely upon the supposition that
because of the government's practical experience, its constitutional competence and the need for flexibility in the management of foreign affairs, the requirement of a warrant for surveillance would unduly frustrate the government's ability to
protect itself." It is not entirely clear that this supposition is
justified. Surely the government has just as much need to act
with stealth, speed, and secrecy in the area of domestic security
as it does in foreign intelligence. Moreover, the executive
branch is charged by the Constitution to enforce the criminal
laws just as it is charged to conduct foreign affairs. Its practical
experience and constitutional competence in the area of foreign
affairs should be no greater than its practical experience and
constitutional competence in executing the federal criminal laws
in an attempt to maintain domestic security.
Even with the existence of a foreign intelligence exception
to the warrant requirement, however, there are still some
fourth amendment restraints on the government's ability to
wiretap. The surveillance undertaken must still be reasonable."
Thus, the government cannot indiscriminately wiretap in the
name of foreign intelligence. It must still be able to demonstrate
that there was a reasonable need for the surveillance and that it
was conducted in a reasonable manner under the circumstances.
Jeffery K. Matherly

"Id. at 915.

Id. at 913-14.
, Id. at 914.
13 The "reasonableness" of the surveillance depends upon the circumstances
which exist in each particular case. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
Tile Fourth Circuit determined that the surveillance of Truong had been conducted in a reasonable manner. 629 F.2d at 916-17.
"
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FOURTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS
EXTRADITION: THE PRESENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

In Zambito v. Blair,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit examined the constraints which the fourth
amendment places on interstate extradition. In this case the accused was charged with armed robbery in Florida. After the
robbery the accused fled to West Virginia. The governor of Florida made a demand on the governor of West Virginia for the arrest and extradition of the accused. This demand was accompanied by an affidavit of probable cause executed by a Florida
deputy sheriff containing data which had led the deputy to
believe that the accused had committed the robbery for which
he was charged. A Florida circuit judge had made a finding of
probable cause based upon this affidavit; however, no statement
of this fact was included in the documents accompanying the demand for extradition. The governor of West Virginia decided to
comply with the demand and executed a warrant for the accused's
arrest. The accused then attacked this arrest warrant through a
writ of habeas corpus and ultimately this matter reached the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.' The accused contended that
the West Virginia arrest warrant was constitutionally invalid
because the demand papers before the governor of West Virginia at the time the warrant was issued failed to show on their
face a judicial finding of probable cause.'
The United States Constitution provides that

1 610 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1979).
2 Zambito first filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a West Virginia
circuit court. This petition was denied and an appeal from this judgment was
denied by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
After exhausting his state court remedies, Zambito filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia. This court granted the writ and stayed Zambito's extradition. The
effectiveness of the writ, however, was stayed for a thirty-day period so that the
arresting sheriff would have an opportunity to demonstrate that a "judicialdetermination of probable cause had been made in Florida" concerning Zambito's participation in the armed robbery. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
Within this thirty-day period, the arresting sheriff presented to the district
court an "Order Finding Probable Cause" signed by a Florida circuit judge. Finding this order to be a sufficient judicial determination of probable cause, the
district court withdrew the writ of habeas corpus previously granted and lifted
the stay against Zambito's extradition. Zambito appealed the court's decision.
I Id. at 1194-95.
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[a] person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another
State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State
having Jurisdiction of the crime.'
In addition to these constitutional requirements, West Virginia
has statutory requirements that must be met before the governor can 'issue an arrest warrant for extradition purposes.'
Basically, these requirements are that the governor may not
honor an extradition demand unless he is presented with written allegations that a crime was committed in the demanding
state, that the accused was present in the demanding state at
the time of the commission of the crime, and that he has fled
from the demanding state.8 In addition, the demand must be accompanied by a copy of the indictment or information filed
against the accused.7 In the present case all of these statutory
requirements were met.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
also places certain restrictions on the extradition process. This
amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation ..... "8 With this
constitutional language in mind, the United States Supreme
Court has held that no warrant for arrest can be constitutionally
valid unless there has first been a judicial finding that a crime
has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe
that the accused committed the crime.9 The Court has reasoned
that any arrest and confinement "may imperil the suspect's job,
interrupt his source of income, and impair his' family relationships.... When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment
of a neutral magistrate is essential ....
10This protection is
even more essential in the extradition situation. Not only is the
accused arrested and confined, but he could be transported hun-

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
The West Virginia extradition procedure is set out in W. VA. CODE §§ 5-1-7
through 5-1-13 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 5-1-7(c) (1979 Replacement Vol.)
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
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dreds or thousands of miles away from his job and home. Before
depriving an individual of his liberty to such a great extent, it is
imperative that an impartial judicial officer make a determination that reasonable grounds exist for making the arrest.' Thus,
the district court in this case held that it is mandatory that
there be a judicial finding of probable cause to support an arrest
and extradition request. 2
The Fourth Circuit held in Zambito that while a statement
declaring that there had been a judicial finding of probable
cause in the demanding state is sufficient basis for a governor of
the asylum state to issue an arrest warrant, it is not absolutely
required." A governor may infer from the presentation of sufficient facts to support a judicial finding of probable cause and the
fact that the demanding governor has asserted his right to extradition that the required judicial action has taken place. 4
Thus, as in this case, a governor may issue an arrest warrant in
the absence of a statement of a judicial finding of probable cause
if the demand is accompanied by facts that indicate probable
cause did exist. 5 In Zambito the demand was accompanied by an
affidavit executed by a deputy sheriff containing data which
linked Zambito to the crime.' From this information the governor of West Virginia could infer that there had been a judicial
finding of probable cause. 7 However, the mere fact that the
documents on their face indicate that a judicial finding of probable cause has taken place is not conclusive. The accused may
still seek "an independent court inquiry as to whether such a
finding ha[s] been made," no matter what the documents say. 8

1,Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
12610 F.2d 1192, 1194. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed that

this conclusion was correct. Id. at 1194, n.3.
,1610 F.2d at 1196.
14Id.

"Id.
"Id. at 1194.
'

Id. at 1196.

"Id. The Fourth Circuit believed that this type of court inquiry would not
run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. at 290
prohibiting such court inquiries in the asylum state "when a neutral judicial of-

ficer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists."
The Fourth Circuit stated that "[t]he statement in the demanding papers

that there has been a finding of probable cause is no more conclusive than would
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Thus, the accused is not left without a remedy during the extradition process.
In summary, Zambito establishes essentially two prerequisites to the issuance of a valid warrant by a governor for extradition. First, there must have been a judicial determination
that probable cause existed for the arrest of the accused by the
demanding state. Second, there must be sufficient documentation of the fact that such a determination was made from which
the governor of the asylum state can infer that a determination
was actually made. This documentation can be either in the form
of a statement declaring that a probable cause finding occured
or in the form of facts that would be sufficient to support a
judicial finding of probable cause in the demanding state.
Jeffery K. Matherly

LABOR LAW
I.

THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR'S DUTY TO
TRANSMIT THE RECORD

In NLRB v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., Inc.,' the National
Labor Relations Board (hereinafter Board) petitioned the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce its order requiring the
respondent, Cambridge Wire, to bargain with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter Union).
Cambridge Wire had refused to bargain with the Union
after its objections to a representation election had been overruled by the Regional Director without a hearing' and its appeal

be an absence of such a statement. It is the actual fact, not the statement or lack
of a statement that in the end, matters." 610 F.2d at 1196.

622 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1980).
Cambridge Wire challenged the propriety of the representation election
because of alleged union misconduct during the campaign. It contended:
a) that the Union was responsible for defacing official election notices
by affixing Union labels stating "Vote Yes" on the plexiglass front
of bulletin boards which contained sample ballots of the election;
b) that two persons acting on behalf of or with the acquiescence of the
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of that decision had been denied by the Board. The Union set
forth this refusal to bargain in a complaint to the Board. At the
time this complaint was heard, Cambridge Wire raised its objections to the election again; however, the Board considered it unnecessary to reach the merits of Cambridge Wire's allegations
finding "no abuse of discretion" on the part of the Regional
director in not directing a hearing on Cambridge Wire's original
complaint.'
The Fourth Circuit also found it unnecessary to address the
substance of Cambridge Wire's objections to the election finding
instead that "the Board had failed to comply with its own regulations" in the denial of Cambridge Wire's original request for
the review of the Regional Director's decision.' One of the
arguments made by Cambridge Wire to the court was that the
Board's affirmation of the Regional Director's findings was invalid because the entire record was not before the Board in its
review of the Regional Director's decision. The Regional Director had transmitted only a portion of the evidence considered by
him to the Board., As a result, the Board's decision was premised almost entirely upon the findings of the Regional Director, rather than an independent examination of the evidence.
This situation presented the court with the issue of whether
the Regional Director has the responsibility to transfer all
evidence considered by him in his decision or only that which he
considers relevant.
It should be noted at the outset that this case involves an
Union coerced and threatened various employees to vote for the

Union;
c) that the Union issued material misrepresentations in its campaign

literature, specifically:
(1) this union would never go out on strike;
(2) there would never be any "sympathy" strikes; and

(3) the employees would be dealing with a local union.
622 F.2d at 1197.
3

622 F.2d at 1197.

4Id.
5 The only evidence tendered to the Board by the Regional Director was his
decision and three pictures "depicting the alleged defacement by the Union of
bulletin boards containing the sample ballots." Id. at 1198. The "voluminous
material" relating to other issues of the case was retained by the Regional Direc-

tor. Id.
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appeal of a decision by the Regional Director without the benefit
of a hearing. Where there has been a hearing, the entire record
must be transmitted by the Regional Director if an appeal is
taken." The Board's regulations, however, are somewhat ambiguous with regard to what is required of a Regional Director
in the absence of a hearing. This ambiguity is primarily the
result of a section of the Board's procedural regulations which
provides:
[T]hat in a proceeding in which no hearing is held, a party filing
exceptions to a regional director's report on objections or challenges, a request for review of a regional director's decision on
objections of challenges, or any opposition thereto, may append
to its submission to the Board copies of documents it has timely
submitted to the regional director and which were not included
in the report or decision.7
The Board has interpreted this section as relieving a Regional
Director of an absolute duty to transfer all evidence comprising
' This requirement is set forth in the Board's procedural rules at 29 C.F.R. §

102.68 (1980) and 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(g) (1980). 29 C.F.R. § 102.68 provides:
The record in the proceeding shall consist of: the petition, notice of
hearing with affidavit of service thereof, motions, rulings, orders, the
stenographic report of the hearing and of any oral argument before the
regional director, stipulations, exhibits, documentary evidence, affidavits of service, depositions, and any briefs or other legal memoranda
submitted by the parties to the regional director or to the Board, and
the decision of the regional director, if any. Immediately upon issuance
by the regional director of an order transferring the case to the Board,
or upon issuance of an order granting a request for review by the
Board, the regional director shall transmit the record to the board.
(emphasis added).
29 C.F.R. § 102.69(g) provides:
The notice of hearing, motions, rulings, orders, stenographic report of

the hearing, stipulations, exceptions, documentary evidence, together
with the objections to the conduct of the election or conduct affecting
the results of the election, any report on such objections, any report on
challenged ballots, exceptions to any such report, any briefs or other
legal memoranda submitted by the parties, the decision of the regional
director, if any, and the record previously made as described in §
102.68, shall constitute the record in the case .... Immediately upon issuance of a report on objections of challenges, or both, upon issuance by
the regional director of an order transferring the case to the Board, or
upon issuance of an order granting a request for review by the board,
the regional director shall transmit the record to the Board.
7 29

C.F.R. § 102.69(g).
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the record to the reviewing body. This responsibility is shared,
it contends, by the appellant.' This interpretation is premised on
the fact that alternative interpretations would tend to render
the clause meaningless. 9
The Fifth Circuit, while having on several occasions skirted
0
a direct resolution of the issue presented in Cambridge Wire,"
seems, at least tacitly, to have adopted the Board's interpretation of its procedural rules. That court appears to distinguish between "documentary evidence" which must be transmitted to
the Board by the Regional Director and "documents" which
should be appended by the appellant to its list of exceptions."
The distinction between "documents" and "documentary
evidence" is not readily apparent, and the Fifth Circuit has not
attempted to explain the difference. The Fifth Circuit has sidestepped direct resolution of the issue in Cambridge Wire by applying a "harmless error" test whenever all the evidence considered by the Regional Director is not transmitted by him to
the Board. 2 This test involves an examination of both evidence
before the reviewing body and that which was withheld. As long
as the general import of all the evidence is before the reviewing
body, the failure to transmit specific items will be deemed
harmless.
The Sixth Circuit, in Prestolite Wire Division v. NLRB,'3
adopted an interpretation of the Board's procedural rule differSee, e.g., NLRB v. Dobbs House, Inc., 613 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. i980),
NLRB v. Osborn Transp. Inc., 589 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1979).
Birmingham Ornamental Iron Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir.
1980).
11See Birmingham Ornamental Iron Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
1980); NLRB v. Dobbs House, Inc., 613 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Osborn
Transp., Inc., 589 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1979); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v.
NLRB, 407 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1969).
" See NLRB v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 589 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1980).
The distinction between "documentary evidence" and "documents" is apparently
premised on the fact that section 102.68 of the Board's procedural rules (29 C.F.R.
§ 102.68) refers to "documentary evidence," among others, as things which must
be transmitted to the Board, while section 102.69(g) (29 C.F.R. § 102.69(g)) permits
a party excepting to a Regional Director's decision to append copies of
"documents" which it has submitted to the Regional Director but were not included
in his record or report to the Board.
" See note 10 supra.
13

592 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1979).
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ent from that of the Fifth Circuit." Prestolite involved facts
similar to Cambridge Wire, and there the court said: "Without
expressly ruling that the Regional Director is invariably required under Section 102.69(g) to transmit to the Board all of the
materials considered by him (although the language says 'shall'),
we think the better practice is to do so ...."11 The court held

that the clause dealing with the appellant's right under section
102.69(g) to append other evidence not included within the
Regional Director's report was "insufficent" to shift the burden
of "assembling and transmitting the record" from the Regional
Director to the petitioner."
While the court in Prestolite did not expressly rule that the
failure to transmit the entire record would automatically result
in setting aside the Board's findings, as a practical matter, this
would normally be the case." This fact may be presumed since,
as the court in Prestolite points out, when the entire record is
not transferred, the petitioner's objections will be construed in
the most favorable manner."8
The Fourth Circuit, in resolving the issue presented in Cambridge Wire, appears to have adopted elements of both the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits' approaches. Following the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning, it held that "[a]s a matter of common sense, the
Regional Director who has possession of the materials in the
record, is the logical party to transmit that record to the
Board." 9 The court believed that the Regional Director has a
duty under the Board's procedural rules to transmit to the
" Accord, NLRB v. RJR Archer, Inc., 617 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
" 592 F.2d at 305.
15 d.
" The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the position taken in an earlier decision that
on an appeal "[t]he Board is entitled to rely on the report of the Regional Director
in the absence of specific assertions of error, substantiated by offers of proof."
NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc. 379 F.2d 172, 178 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 389
U.S. 958 (1967). Thus in those instances where an appellant's objections are
"shotgunned" and "lacking in factual detail" the failure of the Regional Director
to transmit the entire record will not result in a setting aside of the Board's conclusions. Prestolite Wire Div. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 302, 306 (6th Cir. 1979).
" The result of this treatment of the petitioner's allegations is that, in most
instances, the Board's decision to reject the petitioner's claim will be considered
"an abuse of discretion." 592 F.2d at 307.

" 622 F.2d at 1199.
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which were part of the record and conBoard "all the materials
20
sidered by him."
The Fourth Circuit, however, apparently adopted the Fifth
Circuit's "harmless error" test to determine whether a failure to
transmit a part of the record warrants a setting aside of the
Board's findings rather than adopting the Sixth Circuit's practhe Board's findings
tice of almost automatically setting aside
21
when a failure to transmit has occured.
The Fourth Circuit approach avoids the inefficiency and
complications that arise from having two parties, the Regional
Director and the appellant, transmit the material contained in
the record to the Board. It also avoids needless overturning of
board decisions because of a failure on the part of the Regional
Director to transmit an unimportant document along with the
rest of the record by adopting the "harmless error" test. The
Fourth Circuit has combined the best of the different approaches used by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in deciding the
issue presented in Cambridge Wire.
Randal A. Minor
II. BONUS PAYMENTS TO NON-STRIKING EMPLOYEES AND
SECTION 8(a)(5) OF THE WAGNER ACT
In S & W Motor Lines, Inc. v. NLRB1 a trucking company attempted to continue its operations despite a strike by a local of
the Teamsters Union (hereinafter Union). One method of achieving this goal was to pay a fifty dollar per trip bonus to nonstriking, over-the-road drivers, all of whom were members of the
bargaining unit and some of whom were members of the Union.
The Union citing, inter alia, this practice and S & W Motor
Line's refusal to accede to its request to provide it with a list of
non-bargaining unit employees who had been laid off during the
strike sought to have the company charged with violations of
0 Id.

The court did not explicitly adopt a "harmless error" test although it
stated in Cambridge Wire that it could not "view the failure to transmit the
record in this case as harmless:' Id. (emphasis added).
21

' 621 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1980).
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sections
8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations
2
Act.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) held that the bonus payments constitued violation of sections 8(a)(1) 3 and (5)4 and that
the failure to provide the requested list violated section 8(a)(5).
A three-member panel of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) modified the ALJ's order by requiring S & W Motor
Lines to pay to any striking, over-the-road drivers reinstated
after the strike the average amount earned by non-striking drivers as a result of the bonus payments. As modified, the NLRB
affirmed the order of the ALJP
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the ALJ's
determinations that the bonus payments' and the company's
refusal to provide the list of laid-off, non-bargaining unit employees 7 constituted violations of section 8(a)(5). The ALJ had determined that the bonus payments constituted an attempt to
bypass the selected bargaining representative and negotiate
directly with the employees in violation of section 8(a)(5). The
Fourth Circuit rejected this view because "[a] strike was in
progress, and it [was] apparent that the Union would have refused
to approve special payments to non-striking workers."8 The
court distinguished the cases of NLRB v. Rubatex Corp.' and
NLRB v. Aero-Motive Mfg. Co."0 which had upheld violations of
section 8(a)(5) when bonus payments similar to those in this case
had been made because in those instances "the bonus payments ...
came after the strike was over and a new collective bargaining
agreement had been signed."" In those cases, there was a
' 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). The ALJ determined that the bonus payments
"constituted an attempt to bypass the selected bargaining representative and
negotiate directly with employees in violation of § 8(a)(5)." 621 F.2d at 601.
621 F.2d at 601.
Id. The court upheld the ALJ's finding that the bonus payments constituted violations of section 8(a)(1). It believed that this "conclusion, though not
compelled, was permitted by the evidence before the ALJ." Id
Id. at 602-03.
'Id. at 601-02.
601 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979).
1' 475 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1973).
" 621 F.2d at 602.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/14

68

et al.: Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit: 1980
FOURTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS

1981]

possibility that the Union may have reacted in "some useful
fashion" to the company's request to award bonus payments to
non-striking employees. 2
The rationale of the Rubatex and Aero-Motive cases, the
court claimed, was that negotiations with the Union over the
bonuses would have provided the Union with an opportunity to
demonstrate to the employer the illegality of the proposed
bonuses at a time when the bonus payments could have been
stopped. 3 The court believed that such a view was warranted in
a period of labor peace where the "availability of employees has
been assured through the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement."" These conditions, however, do not exist in a
situation where a strike is in progress, the employer is endeavoring to continue in operation, and the striking employees have
sabotaged equipment and engaged in a campaign of harassment.
In devising a rule to determine when bonus payments will
constitute a violation of section 8(a)(5), the court focused on the
character of the 8(a)(1) violation which often results from the
payment of bonuses of this kind. Where, as in Rubatex and
Aero-Motive, a post-strike, post-new collective bargaining agreement situation exists, the illegality of special payments to nonstrikers under section 8(a)(1) is "patent" and "indisputable."' 5 In
these instances, bonus payments to non-striking employees
would constitute a violation of section 8(a)(5)."
On the other hand, in situations like the one that existed in
the instant case, bonus payments may or may not be prohibited
by section 8(a)(1). 7 In these instances, bonus payments to non"Id.
" Judge Hall, in dissent, believed that the court misconstrued the rationale
of the Aero-Motive and Rubatex cases. He stated that
[alithough these opinions address the issue of illegal bonus payments
made after the conclusion of a strike, the violations of § 8(a)(5) were
found to exist because the employer, in each case, had circumvented the

prescribed bargaining process and its potentially preventative effect on
questionable, if not outright illegal, conduct.

621 F.2d at 604.
14
Id.
15Id.
1Id.
"

The court stated that "[tihe record contained disputed evidence and we

would have been obliged to sustain a finding either way." Id.
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striking employees will not constitute a violation of section
8(a)(5). The court stated that "[iut would unreasonably subject
the Employer to a responsibility to foresee what the NLRB's
ultimate resolution of a possible § 8(a)(1) charge would be."18
The second aspect of the ALJ's order struck down by the
court was the holding that the employer's refusal to supply the
Union with a list of the non-bargaining unit employees laid-off
during the strike and copies of their lay-off notices constituted a
section 8(a)(5) violation. The court reasoned that the Union's
motive in requesting such a list could not automatically be considered proper in those instances, like the present case, where
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement to replace
one that has expired have stalled.19 Moreover, the court believed
that the employer could properly resist attempts to obtain this
information in order to avoid "dislocations" and "disruptions" of
its non-bargaining unit employees and to protect their "rights of
privacy."'
Thus, the court held that the employer's refusal to furnish
information relating to non-bargaining unit employees will not
constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) unless
the Union has "made [a] demonstration to the employer of [the]
need to know" the information.21 Since no reason was given by
the Union in this case for its request, S & W Motor Line's
refusal to provide the requested information did not constitute a
section 8(a)(5) violation.'
Randal A. Minor

Id. Judge Hall, in dissent, stated that the general principle, adhered to by
the ALJ and the NLRB was that "the unilateral granting of bonuses to employees
during negotiations without consulting the bargaining representative violates §
8(aX5)." Id. at 605 (citing NLRB v. Union Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1950)). He
believed that neither Rubatex nor Aero-Motive supported "a departure from this
established rule in favor of a more narrowly drawn statement that only poststrike, clear-cut violations of § 8(a)(1) will permit a finding of illegality under § 8
(a)(5)." Id.
1'Id. at 603. The Union had included no "justification" in its letter requesting this information from S & W Motor Lines.
20Id.

21Id.
" See note 19, supra. Judge Hall, in dissent, believed that the majority's requirement that a Union must articulate "a need to know" before it can receive in-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss3/14

70

et al.: Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit: 1980

1981]

FOURTH CIRCUIT DEVELOPMENTS

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
I.

MAINTAINING AN ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983
FOR SEXUAL ASSAULTS

Due to the dynamics of prison life, many prisoners in state
penal institutions face the threat of assaults by other prisoners.
When these assaults occur, prison officials are often charged
with liability. In the majority of actions, liability is premised on
ordinary negligence; however, under appropriate circumstances,
an action can be based on a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To
maintain an action under section 1983 the state prisoner must
establish that his federal constitutional rights were violated
under the color of state law.1
Recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
question of the degree of wrong which must be proven to sustain an action under section 1983 when a prisoner has been
assaulted by another prisoner. In Withers v. Levine,2 the plaintiff, a young, slightly built, black man, was homosexually raped
by his cellmate in the medium security Maryland House of Corrections (MHC). Withers upon his initial arrival at MHC was involved in a fight "with his cellmate who attempted a sexual
assault."3 After a brief period in solitary confinement, Withers
requested and was granted a transfer to the Maryland Correcformation relating to non-bargaining unit employees "elevate[d] form over
substance:' Id. at 606. In this case, he concluded that the employer knew that the
information requested by the Union was "clearly relevant" to prove its claim of
"discriminatory treatment of employees due to union representation." Id. Thus,
he concluded that the purpose of the relevancy requirement-giving employers
the opportunity to determine the validity of the request for information in order
to protect the rights of non-bargaining unit members-was "clearly met" in this

situation. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980).

8 Id. at 160.
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tional Institute at Hagerstown.4 Eighteen months later, however, he was transferred back to MHC. Despite the fact that the
records office of MHC had Withers' file which contained information about the earlier assault upon him, this file was not
available to cell assignment officials. As a result, Withers was
placed in a cell with a man named Redd whose file, also unavailable to the cell assignment officials, reported that he "had a
history of violent, aggresstive sexual assaults."' Withers was
assaulted by Redd on the second night in his cell.
Withers filed a section 1983 action against Maryland prison
officials in federal district court. The court granted declaratory
and injunctive relief, requiring the prison officials to devise a
procedure to provide inmates with reasonable protection from
sexual assaults.' The prison officials appealed.
The Fourth Circuit had previously stated, in the case of
Woodhous v. Virginia, that a prisoner had a constitutional right
"to be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence
and sexual assault from his fellow inmates."7 To prevail in a section 1983 action a prisoner had to demonstrate a "pervasive risk
of harm to inmates from other prisoners" and that prison officials had "failed to exercise reasonable care" to prevent the unreasonable risk of harm or harm itself.8 The court in Woodhous
suggested that an isolated attack by one prisoner upon another
would not demonstrate a "pervasive risk of harm," however
"confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign is actionable." 9
The court in Withers rejected the MHC officials' contention

This prison was chosen because of Withers "age and his victimization by
sexually aggressive prisoners." Id.
'Id.
Withers v. Levine, 449 F. Supp. 473 (D.Md. 1978). The court rejected

Withers' claim for money damages finding that there was "no indication under
the facts of the case that the defendants acted with improper motivation." Id. at
479.

487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973). The constitutional right protected is the
right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment secured by the eighth
amendment and made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment

of the United States Constitution. Id.
8Id.

'Id.
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that Woodhous required that "something approaching anarchy"
must be proven and something more than simple negligence
demonstrated before section 1983 could be utilized.10 It stated
that an assault would be actionable under section 1983 if "violence and sexual assaults occur[red]... with sufficient frequency" against an identifiable group of prisoners to put that group
in reasonable fear for their safety and to alert prison officials of
the problem and the need to take corrective measures.' 1 The
court found that Withers belonged to an identifiable group of
young and slightly built prisoners and that the problem of sexual assault against this group in the MHC was pervasive enough
to alert prison officials of the need to provide reasonable protection for members of this group. 2 Given this situation, the court
held that "negligence by prison officials in the performance of
their duty of care is a violation of the constitutional right and actionable under § 1983.""1 The court believed that a mere negligence standard was necessary because the prisoners' constitutional right may remain "unredressed" if a higher standard of
care were employed.
In addressing the facts of the case before it, the court believed
that "the absence of any procedure or guidelines to assist
assigning officials" in making cell assignments to assure that
sexually aggressive prisoners are not placed in cells with prisoners who have been or are likely to be victims of sexual assaults
"was probably much more than simple negligence."" The court,
therefore, upheld the district court's injunction which had
directed Maryland prison officials to develop cell assignment
procedures with safety as a "leading criterion."' 5
Thomas H. Fluharty

, 615 F.2d at 161.

"Id.
2

The court found that, "[t]ypieally, the attacks are upon younger prisoners,

and a young, white, slightly built man is at the greatest risk of all. Withers,
although black, otherwise fits this description." Id. at 160.
1IId. at 162 (emphasis added).
14
Id.
11449 F. Supp. at 478. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of
monetary damages. It stated that "in a § 1983 action, [a defendant] is responsible
in damages only when he acts in violation of a 'clearly established' constitutional
right:' 615 F.2d at 163 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) and
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TAX
I.

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A DEED CONTEST COMPROMISE

"The purpose of allowing charitable deductions is to encourage testators to make charitable bequests, not to permit executors and beneficiaries to rewrite a will so as to achieve a tax
savings."1 This proposition has been judicially stated numerous
times2 and recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reiterated this view in Estate of Burgess v. Commissioner.' The
court also upheld the Tax Court of the United States' interpretation' of section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,6 and the corresponding
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)). The court noted that the Woodhous decision, although announced, had not been published at the time Withers was
assaulted; and, moreover, it had defined the protected right only "in broad
outline." Id. Thus, it affirmed the district court's conclusion that the prison officials had no reason to "believe they were violating a constitutional right." Id.
' Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing
Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924)).
2 Paris v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Lamson's Estate
v. United States, 338 F.2d 376 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1964); Senft v. United States, 319 F.2d
642 (3rd Cir. 1963); Norris v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1943); Robbins v.
Comm'r, 111 F.2d 828 (1st Cir. 1940). See also Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger,
348 U.S. 187 (1955); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 438 F.2d 684 (1st Cir.
1971); Farmers Trust Co. v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 94 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
3 622 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1980). In Burgess, the Fourth Circuit stated that
"[w]hile those persons mentioned in the will had the power to divide the property
by agreement inter se, they could not maneuver their interests so as to rewrite
the will and, thereby, achieve a tax savings." Id. at 704.
' Estate of Burgess v. Comm'r., 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 335 (1979).
At the date of Grafton Burgess' death (June 23, 1973), the pertinent parts
of section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, provided:
(a) In general.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001,
the value of the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from
the value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests, legacies,
devises, or transfers (including the interest which falls into any such bequest, legacy, devise, or transfer as a result of an irrevocable disclaimer
of a bequest, legacy, devise, transfer, or power, if the disclaimer is made
before the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return) ....
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and
operated exclusively for religious charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, including the encouragement of art and the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings
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Estate Tax Regulations."
of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statement), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office; ...
For purposes of this subsection, the complete termination before the
date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return of a power to consume, invade, or appropriate property for the benefit of an individual
before such power has been exercised by reason of the death of such individual or for any other reason shall be considered and deemed to be
an irrevocable disclaimer with the same full force and effect as though
he had filed such irrevocable disclaimer.
(e)

Disallowance of Deductions in Certain Case.-

(2) Where an interest in property (other than a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm or an undivided portion of the
decedent's entire interest in property) passes or has passed from the
decedent to a person, or for a use, described in subsection (a), and an interest (other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's
death) in the same property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to a person, or for a use, not described in subsection (a), no deduction shall be allowed under this section for the interest which passes or
has passed to the person, or for the use, described in subsection (a)
unless(A) in the case of a remainder interest, such interest is
in a trust which is a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable
remainder unitrust (described in section 664) or a pooled income fund
described in section 642(c)(5), or
(B) in the case of any other interest such interest is in
the form of a guaranteed annuity or is a fixed percentage distributed
yearly of the fair market value of the property (to be determined yearly).
The pertinent parts of 26 C.F.R. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)i, ii, iii (1980) provide:
(e) Limitation applicable to decedents dying after December 81,
1969- 1) Disallowance of deduction. In general, in the case of
decedents dying after December 31, 1969, where an interest in property
passes or has passed from the decedent for charitable purposes and an
interest (other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's death) in the same property passes or has passed from the decedent for private purposes (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) after October 9, 1969, no deduction is
allowed under section 2055 for the value of the interest which passes or
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The facts of the case reveal that Grafton Burgess obtained
eleven tracts of real property by deed from his mother. Of this
has passed for charitable purposes unless the interest in property is a
deductible interest described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.
The principles of section 2056 and the regulations thereunder shall apply for purposes of determining under this subparagraph whether an interest in property passes or has passd from the decedent....
(2) Deductible interests. A deductible interest for purposes
of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph is a chartiable interest in property
where(i) Undivided portion of decedent's entire interest. The
charitable interest is an undivided portion, not in trust of the decedent's
entire interest in property. An undivided portion of a decedent's entire
interest in property must consist of a fraction or percentage of each and
every substantial interest or right owned by the decedent in such property and must extend over the entire term of the decedent's interest in
such property and in other property into which such property is converted. For example, if the decedent transferred a life estate in an office building to his wife for her life and retained a reversionary interest
in the office building, the devise by the decedent of one-half of that
reversionary interest to charity while his wife is still alive will not be
considered the transfer of a deductible interest; because an interest in
the same property has already passed from the decedent for private
purposes, the reversionary interest will not be considered the
decedent's entire interest in the property. If, on the other hand, the
decedent had been given a life estate in Blackacre for the life of his wife
and the decedent had no other interest in Blackacre at any time during
his life, the devise by the decedent of one-half of that life estate to charity would be considered the transfer of a deductible interest; because
the life estate would be considered the decedent's entire interest in the
property, the devise would be of an undivided portion of such entire interest.
(ii) Remainder interest in personal residence. The
charitable interest is a remainder interest, not in trust, in a personal
residence. Thus, for example, if the decedent devises to charity a remainder interest in a personal residence and bequeaths to his surviving
spouse a life estate in such property, the value of the remainder interest is deductible under section 2055. For purposes of this subdivision,
the term "personal residence" means any property which was used by
the decedent as his personal residence even though it was not used as
his principal residence.
(iii) Remainder interest in a farm. The charitable interest is a remainder interest, not in trust, in a farm. Thus, for example,
if the decedent devises to charity a remainder interest in a farm and bequeaths to his daughter a life estate in such property, the value of the
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property, Grafton received the fee simple title to eight tracts
and a remainder interest in three tracts.7 On June 23, 1973, Grafton died, and by his will made a few specific bequests and
devises. In particular, Grafton's brother received two small
parcels for life.' The remainder of Grafton's property passed into a residuary trust for the benefit of his mother during her
lifetime.' Upon the mother's death, the remainder interest in the
residuary trust property would pass in fee simple to two
Lutheran churches.
Grafton's brother instituted a deed contest to set aside his
mother's conveyances to Grafton, asserting that she had been
subjected to undue influence. Grafton's will, however, was never
questioned.'" Prior to the trial of the deed contest, all parties in
interest reached a compromise settlement. The final decree of
the state court provided:
[t]hat the mother's life interest in the trust be dissolved; that
she continue to hold a life interest in her business properties
and residence, ... that a tract of 42.5 acres be alloted to Ralph

[Grafton's brother] in fee, with the understanding that he would
support his mother for the rest of her life."
As a result of this state court order, the contingent remainder
interest in the residuary
trust passed immediately in fee simple
2
to the two churches.'

remainder interest is deductible under section 2055. For purposes of
this subdivision, the term "farm" means any land used by the decedent
or his tenant for the production of crops, fruits, or other agricultural
products or for the sustenance of livestock. The term "livestock" includes cattle, hogs, horses, mules, donkeys, sheep, goats, captive furbearing animals, chickens, turkeys, pigeons, and other poultry. A farm
includes the improvements thereon.
7 As to these three tracts, Grafton's mother retained a life estate in 18 acres
surrounding her home and two one acre tracts of business property. 622 F.2d at
702.
' "Under the decedent's will, Ralph (Grafton's brother) received only a life
interest in approximately 7.5 acres of land:' 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 336, n.2.
' "The trustees of this residuary trust were given the broad discretion to
pay or apply net income of the trust, and if income was insufficient, the corpus of
the trust, to or for the benefit of the mother." Id. at 335.
10 "Indeed, no renunciation of the will by any heir was ever filed with the
Superior Court of Alexander County, North Carolina." Id. at 339, n.9.
" 622 F.2d at 712.
12Id.
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In preparing the tax return for Grafton's estate, the executor claimed an estate tax charitable deduction under section
2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969,13 for the value of the property received
by the churches. Upon the disallowance of the claimed charitable deduction by the Commission of Internal Revenue, the executor petitioned the Tax Court of the United States for a
redetermination. The Tax Court upheld 'the disallowance and
the executor appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Two issues confronted the court regarding the estate tax
treatment of the fee simple interest passing to the two churches
as a result of the deed contest compromise." First, did the churches' fee simple interest pass by inheritance? Second, did Grafton's remainder interest in the three tracts pass to the churches
under an exception to section 2055(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 196915 The
Fourth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, answered both of these
questions in the negative and affirmed the decision of the Tax
Court.
As his primary argument, the executor of the Burgess
estate claimed that the compromise settlement [consent judgment] of the deed contest was similar to the will contest compromise found in Lyeth v. Hoey. 6 Drawing this analogy, the executor asserted that the fee simple title passed to the churches
"' See note 5 supra.
" The Tax Court stated that "The dispute between the parties is over the

effect that the consent judgment has upon the allowability of the deduction under
section 2055." 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 338. Going further the Tax Court said, "The
question to be decided is whether the fee simple interests ultimately received by
the churches passed under the decedents will or whether they were first received

by the mother and then transferred to the churches. A charitable deduction
would be allowable in the first instance, but not in the second." Id. at 338.
15 See note 5 supra.
,' 305 U.S. 188 (1938). The executor also relied heavily on a line of cases
which hold generally that if the status of the recipient as an heirnor beneficiary is
what enabled him to obtain his compromise share, then the compromise interest
passed by bequest or inheritance under the Federal revenue statutes. See In re
Sage's Estate, 122 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1941); Thompson's Estate v. Comm'r., 123
F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1941); But see Estate of Morris v. Comm'r., 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 974
(1966); Robbins v. Comm'r., 111 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1940). For a discussion of will
contests see Kemp, How to Achieve Optimum Income, Gift, and Estate Tax
Benefits in a Will Contest, 38 J. TAXATION 285 (1973); Kemp, Federal Tax
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by bequest or inheritance and therefore qualified for the estate
tax charitable deduction under section 2055.17 The Fourth Circuit, in accord with the Tax Court's decision, refused to accept
the executor's contention.18 The court distinguished the Burgess
factual situation from the circumstances in Lyeth. The court
pointed out Lyeth, "involved an heir to a will contest and thus,
was framed from beginning to end in a testamentary setting." 19
In contrast, the Burgess case dealt with a "suit challenging the
validity of deeds signed, sealed and delivered before [Grafton's]
death and without reference to a testamentary environment or
context."2 The beneficiaries in Burgess did not adhere to the
testamentary plan but rather "redistributed the property of the
deceased when they settled the suit aimed at striking down the
questioned conveyances."2 The result of the deed contest and
the compromise which followed did not reflect the donative intent of Grafton Burgess, but rather evidenced the contractual
agreement of the parties in interest.'
Of utmost importance in the court's decision was the fact
that had the will operated, the executor would not have been
able to claim an estate tax charitable deduction." This situation
would have arisen because Grafton's will created non-deductible
"split-interests" by conveying a life estate to Grafton's mother
and a remainder interest to the two churces. If the executor's
Lyeth analogy was accepted, then the beneficiaries of Grafton's
will would have been converting a "split-interest" trust' into an
Aspects of Will Contests, 23 U. MIALou L. REv. 72 (1968-69); R. Paul, Selected
Studies in FederalTaxation (2d Series 1938).
" See note 5 supra.

, 622 F.2d at 703.

"Id.
'Id.

21Id.
2 Where beneficiaries have entered religious orders and entered contractual
agreements to pass all their property to the order, the Commissioner has held
such transfers to be nondeductible from the decedent's estate. Rev. Rul. 55-759,
1955-2 C.B. 607; Rev. Rul. 55-760, 1955-2 C.B. 607.
,*In Robbins v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 828 (1st Cir. 1940), the court refused to
allow a will contest settlement to take the place of the will for estate tax purposes
because a charitable deduction would not have been allowed under the will as

written.
" A "split-interest" may be defined as a transfer made for both private and
charitable purposes.
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outright transfer, thereby achieving a tax savings. Prior case
law has established that this "is not permissible.""
Based on this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the fee simple interest passed to the two churches by purchase,
not inheritance, and was therefore not deductible." In reaching
this conclusion, the court has made clear that the holding of
Lyeth does not extend beyond will contests into nontestamentary disputes.Y
As an alternative argument, the executor claimed that the
"split-interest" property consisting of Grafton's remainder interest in three tracts, which passed by his will into the
residuary trust, constituted one of the section 2055(e)(2) "splitinterest" rule exceptions.' These exceptions are carved out of
the general disallowance language of section 2055(e)(2) and allow
an estate tax charitable deduction where the property transferred "is a remainder in a personal residence or farm or an individual portion of the decedent's entire interest in the property".1 While the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Grafton conveyed his entire remainder interest in the three tracts, it noted
that interest did not flow through a charitable remainder annuity trust," charitable remainder unitrust, 1 or a pooled income
38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 338. See Underwood v. United States, 407 F.2d 608
(6th Cir. 1969); Robbins. v. Comin'r, 111 F.2d 828 (lst Cir. 1940); and Paris v.
United States, 381 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
28 622 F.2d at 703.

It is important to note that even if "split-interest" property in a nonqualifying trust under section 2055(e)(2)(A) passes directly to a charitable entity as a
result of a will contest, a charitable deduction still might not be allowable. Rev,
Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 332.
The "split-interest" remainder issue involved in Burgess is the same as
was involved in Ellis First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 550 F.2d 9 (U.S. Ct. Cl.
1977). In Ellis, "ft]he crux of the dispute between the parties is whether section
2055(e) allows a deduction only for an outright gift of a remainder interest in a
residence or farm, i.e., one not in trust, or permits, as well, a deduction for a remainder interest in a residence or farm that is in a trust but not one of the trusts
specifically sanctioned by the Act." Id. at 15. The Ellis court stated that one of
the trusts sanctioned by section 2055(e)(2) must be utilized to gain the charitable
deduction. Id. at 16. For a concise discussion of the House and Senate reasoning
behind the 1969 enactment of section 2055(e)(2), see Estate of Brock v. Comm'r.,
71 T.C. 901, 908 (1979).
11 See note 5 supra.

3 For an illustration of a charitable remainder annuity trust see Rev. Rul.
72-395, 1972-2 C.B. 340.
" For an illustration of a charitable remainder unitrust see Rev. Rul. 72-395,
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fund 2 as required by section 2055(e)(2)(A). The court, therefore,
found the executor's argument to be without merit because
Grafton's devise of his remainder interest was neither outright
nor via a qualifying trust as set forth by section 2055(e)(2)A).u
In his final argument, the executor contended that the
Estate Tax Regulations" have the effect of eliminating the exceptions provided by § 2055(e)(2). In construing the effect of the
Estate Tax Regulations on the statute, the Fourth Circuit accepted the Tax Court's statement that:
[r]ather than eliminate those exceptions for all situations, these
regulations merely deny the use of those exceptions by taxpayers in a situation similar to the petitioners. By requiring
such transfers to be either outright or in a trust which would
satisfy another subsection of the statute, the regulations clarify
an otherwise ambiguous statute."
In light of this reasoning, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the estate tax charitable deduction claimed for Grafton's rethree tracts under section 2055(e)(2) was
mainder interest in the
7
properly disallowed.1
James Timothy Meisel
II. INTEREST-FREE LOANS: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
FOLLOWS THE RATIONALE OF Dean v. Commissioner
In 1961 the Tax Court of the United States decided the case
of Dean v. Commissioner1 holding that an interest-free loan from

1972-2 C.B. 340.
For an illustration of a pooled income fund see Rev. Rul. 72-196, 1972-1
C.B. 194.

622 F.2d at 703. See note 5 supra.
Id. It was unnecessary for the court to reach the question of whether the
property actually was a personal residence or a farm because of the nonqualifying trust problem.

See note 6 supra.
38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 339-40.
622 F.2d at 703.
35 T.C. 1083 (1961). For an excellent discussion of interest-free loans see
O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest Free Loans, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (1974), and
Schlifke, Taxing as Income the Receipt of Interest-FreeLoans, 33 U. CH. L. REV.
346 (1966).
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a corporation to a shareholder resulted in no income to the
shareholder. The Tax Court in Dean reasoned that:
had petitioners [Dean and his wifel borrowed the funds in question on interest-bearing notes, their payments of interest would
have been fully deductible by them under section 163, I.R.C.
1954. Not only would they not be charged with the additional
income in controversy herein, but they would have a deduction
equal to that very amount.'
.Because of this so-called interest expense "washout," the Tax
Court concluded that the borrower received no taxable gain
from the interest-free loan under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
In the recent decision of Suttle v. Commissioner,5 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the "washout" theory
articulated in Dean. While the Tax Court has followed this rationale in several interest-free loan cases 6 subsequent to Dean,
the Fourth Circuit7 is the only federal appellate court that has
ruled on the issue.

SI.R.C. § 163(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
1 35 T.C. at 1090. Judge Opper in his concurring opinion asserted that the
statement that "an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower"
is much too broad a generalization to make here. Judge Opper also raised the
question of what tax consequences arise when an interest-free loan is used to purchase tax-exempt obligations.
I I.R.C. § 61 defines gross income as "all income from whatever source
derived."
625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). Albert Suttle's wife, Grace E. Suttle, is a
party in this suit because a joint return was filed for the years in question.
6 Marsh v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Win. G. Martin, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531
(1979); Zager v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979); Creel v. Conm'r, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979);
Greenspun v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 931 (1979); Claude J. Lisle, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627

(1976).
It is interesting to note that the Commissioner did not appeal the Dean decision but did announce a nonacquiescence 12 years later. 1973-1 C.B. 4. Prior to the
decision of Dean, the Commissioner specifically gave tax-free status to interestfree loans between employers and employees in the "split-dollar" insurance context. This ruling, however, has been revoked and replaced. Rev. Rul. 64-328,
1964-2 C.B. 11. In Rev. Rul. 76-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408 the Commissioner stated that
the decision in Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966) would
not be followed. In Johnson, the court held that interest-free loans to children by
parents did not constitute gifts within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
I The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that interest-free loans do not
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The facts in Suttle centered around certain interest-free
loans made from Master Chevrolet Sales, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Master) to Albert Suttle in 1972 and 1973. As president, a member of the board of directors, and a salaried
employee of Master, Suttle had borrowed money interest-free
from the corporation since 1937. The average balance of these
loans during the years in question was around $252,000.8 Using
an interest rate of 5.5 percent, the Commissioner calculated the
interest on these loans to be $13,875.51 for 1972 and $20,159.96
for 1973. Going further, the Commissioner concluded that these
amounts constituted income and represented an economic
benefit to Albert Suttle. The Commissioner issued a notice of
deficiency for the unpaid taxes; and, subsequently, the case was
argued before the Tax Court of the United States. Following its
earlier decision in Dean, the Tax Court found in favor of Suttle
stating that "[wle think that our reasoning in Dean is correct
and is controlling in the instant case, and we follow it." 9 The
Commissioner appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
As in previous interest-free loan cases, the Commissioner
drew an analogy between interest-free loans and the rent-free
use of other corporate assets. To support his argument, the
Commissioner cited several cases holding that a stockholder's or
officer's rent-free use of corporate automobiles, residences and
similar property conferred a taxable benefit equal to the fair
market value of such usage.1" The major distinction between
constitute constructive dividends. Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 497
F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974).
8 Suttle v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1638 (1978).
Id. at 1639.

8

Id. See Frueauff v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (rent-free use of corporate apartment); Reynand Corp. v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 451 (1934) (rent-free use
of corporate house); Chandler v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), afrld, 119 F.2d 623
(3rd Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of corporate apartment and lodge); Dean v. Comm'r,
9 T.C. 256 (1947), affd, 187 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1951) (rent-free use of corporate
house); Rodger's Dairy Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 66 (1950) (personal use of corporate
automobile); Cf. Greenspan v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 138 (1954) revd on othergrounds,
229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm expenses paid by corporation); Silverman v.
Comm'r, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957) affd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958) (wife's travel expenses paid by the corporation).
10

It is interesting to note that the Tax Court has also held that interest-free
loans result in no interest income to the lender. Combs Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 41
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interest-free loans and rent-free use of corporate assets,
however, is the fact that while loan interest payments are
deductible, no such deductions are ordinarily allowed for personal expenditures for transportation and housing. This was the
critical point in Dean. Relying on this factor, the Fourth Circuit
found the Commissioner's argument to be unpersuasive and held
for Suttle 1
It is possible that the entire interest-free loan question will
be put to rest permanently in the near future. The Senate Committee on Appropriations has requested that the Commissioner
"refrain from instituting any additional cases" involving
interest-free loans."
James Timothy Meisel

B.T.A. 339 (1940); Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 304 (1952);
Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 416 (1960). By the same token, the
Tax Court has held that interest-free loans result in no interest expense deduction for the borrower. A. Backus, Jr. & Sons, 6 B.T.A. 590 (1927); Rainbow
Gasoline Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 1050 (1935); Howell v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 364
(1946) rev'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1947); D. Loveman & Son Export Corp. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 776 (1960).
" 625 F.2d' at 1128.
12 Senate Committee on Appropriations Report No. 96-955, Sept. 9, 1980,
page 30 provides the following:
The Committee has learned that the Internal Revenue Service has
initiated a number of cases concerning interest-free loans claiming that
the benefit from low interest or interest-free loans is equal to taxable
income.
The Committee is also aware that the tax court ruled against the
Internal Revenue Service in the J. Simpson Dean case and at least four
other cases on this subject. Additional cases are pending in the fifth and
ninth circuit courts of appeals. Therefore, the Committee urges that the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service refrain from instituting
any additional cases concerning the issue of low-interest loans considered as a benefit equal to taxable income, and requests that IRS
prepare and submit a report to the Committee by November 15, 1980,
with regard to the IRS rationale for proceeding in a fashion contrary to
the court rulings.
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TORTS
I.

THE LOANED SERVANT DOCTRINE AND

THE RIGHT TO CONTROL TEST

In Maynard v. Kenova Chemical Co.1 the Fourth Circuit considered the effect of the loaned servant doctrine on the West
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.' The loaned servant doctrine provides that "[a] servant directed or permitted by his
master to perform services for another may become the servant
of such other in performing the services."'
In Maynard an employee of Manpower Temporary Services
(hereinafter Manpower) was sent to perform general labor for
the Kenova Chemical Company (hereinafter Kenova). In the
course of performing his work for Kenova the employee was injured when a scaffolding collapsed. The employee filed a workmen's compensation claim against Manpower and received a permanent partial disability award. Subsequently, he filed an action
in federal district court against Kenova as a third party tortfeasor, alleging that the dangerous and defective condition of
the scaffolding was the proximate cause of his injury.
The district court granted Kenova's motion for summary
judgment, finding as a matter of law that Maynard, by virtue of
the loaned servant doctrine, was the employee of Kenova within
the meaning of the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act, and, therefore, was precluded by statute from maintaining
the action.'
On appeal, Maynard denied the status of Kenova as his
5
employer and relied upon Kirby v. Union Carbide Corporation
as establishing his right to maintain an action against Kenova.
In Kirby there existed a written agreement between DuPont
626 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1980).
W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to 23-6-1 (1978 Replacement Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1980).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 227 (1958).
The application portion of the West Virginia Act provides:
Any employer subject to this chapter who shall subscribe and pay into
the Workmen's Compensation Fund the premiums provided by this
chapter or who shall elect to make direct payments of compensation as
herein provided, shall not be liable to respond in damages of common
law or by statute for the injury or death of any employee ....
W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1978 Replacement Vol.).

5 373 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1967).
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and Union Carbide which provided that employees supplied by
DuPont to Union Carbide would remain DuPont employees. Kirby, an employee of DuPont, was killed while working at a Union
Carbide plant. Kirby's personal representative then brought a
wrongful death action against Union Carbide. As in Maynard,
however, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding that Kirby was an employee of
Union Carbide whose exclusive remedy was under the state
Workmen's compensation act.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court in Kirby,
holding that: (1) the contract between DuPont and Union Carbide, which provided that employees such as Kirby were to remain DuPont employees, was valid; (2) Union Carbide did not
treat Kirby as an employee; (3) Union Carbide assumed no responsibility in connection with the compensation award; and (4)
in view of the contractual language governing Union Carbide's
liability for injury to DuPont employees, Kirby was not such an
employee of Union Carbide as to preclude his personal representative from seeking redress against Union Carbide for injuries resulting from its alleged negligence.
Maynard contended that Kirby should be controlling with
respect to his claim against Kenova because the same relationship existed between Manpower and Kenova as existed between
DuPont and Union Carbide. The Fourth Circuit, however, in a
per curiam opinion, rejected this argument on the basis that Kirby was premised on the validity of the contract between DuPont
and Union Carbide, whereas no similar contract existed in
Maynard. The court also said that the effect of Kirby was partially negated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
decision in Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,' in which the effect of contractual agreements on the
' The only agreement between Manpower and Kenova was that contained on
the reverse side of the work ticket which Manpower gave to each worker assigned
to a temporary job. The language on the ticket providedr "The customer
recognizes Manpower's employer-employee relationship with its personnel and accepts the obligation to discuss all matters concerning their employment, job
assignments, pay procedures etc., with Manpower." The court found that "[tlhis
language, in and of itself, fails to establish that there was not an employeremployee relationship between Kenova and Maynard." 626 F.2d at 361.
242 S.E.2d 443 (W.Va. 1978).
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rights and duties imposed by the West Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act was restricted.'
Accordingly the Maynard court affirmed the district court's
decision holding that: (1) by viture of the loaned servant doctrine, Kenova became Maynard's special employer; (2) because
Maynard had the right to refuse his assignment to Kenova, an
implied contract of hire existed between him and Kenova; and
(3) the right of Kenova to exercise supervision and control over
Maynard established his status as Kenova's employee.
In relying on the right to control test as the determinative
element in establishing Maynard's status as Kenova's employee,9 the Fourth Circuit returned to an inquiry it had discounted in Kirby. In Kirby the court refused to allow the right
to control test to operate to defeat the plaintiff's claim in view of
the contractual language contained in the agreement between
DuPont and Union Carbide, and because Union Carbide failed to
treat the plaintiff as its employee. Whether the same result
would now be reached by the Fourth Circuit under similar facts
is doubtful given the rule adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Lester v. State Workmen's Compen0
sation Commissioner"
and the reaffirmation of the right to control test contained in Maynard.
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Kirby closely
resembles that taken by the Fifth Circuit in Gaudet v. Exxon

a Lester held that the rights and duties imposed under the Act are not based
upon express or implied contract, but grow out of the employer-employee relationship on which the law imposes certain duties and responsibilities. Thus after
Lester the only significance adhering to a contract between employee and
employer is the existence of the relationship itself. Once that has been established
the rights and duties of the parties are determined by statute. Lester v. State
Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443 (W.Va. 1978).
, The Maynard court approved the district court's use of the right to control
test to determine Maynard's status: "The district court also correctly noted that,
under West Virginia law, Kenova's authority to exercise complete supervision
and control over Maynard while he was on Kenova's premises established Kenova
as Maynard's employer within the meaning of the workmen's qompensation
statutes... :' 626 F.2d at 362. The right to control is also an important factor
under the loaned servant doctrine when determining if an employer-employee
relationship exists. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 220, 227 (1958).
11242 S.E.2d 443 (W.Va. 1978). See note 8 supra.
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1 In Gaudet the court listed nine factors, including
Corporation.
the right to control, to be considered when determining whether
an employee is the loaned servant of another, but reasoned that
the weight to be accorded each factor depends upon the circumstances of each case and the purpose for which the loaned servant doctrine is evoked. The Fourth Circuit's retreat from this
approach in Maynard places it within the company of the
Seventh, Eighth," Ninth," and D.C. Circuits, 5 which have all
placed substantial reliance upon the right to control test when
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship
under the loaned servant doctrine. 8

John H. Bicknell

262 F.2d 351, rehearingdenied 565 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
" Littleton v. Mardigan, 458 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1972).
" Beaver v. Jacuzzi Bros., 454 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1972).
" McCollum v. Smith, 339 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
" Western Marine & Salvage Co. v. Ball, 37 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
" The test was also employed by the United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909). However the continued utility of this
case in workmen's compensation situations was questioned by the Fourth Circuit
in Kirby in light of the Supreme Court's later refusals "to be bound by considerations of control in determining [the existence of] employer-employee relationships
with regard to the application of social legislation." Kirby v. Union Carbide, 373
F.2d 590, 595 (4th Cir. 1967), citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111 (1944) and United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
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